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The establishment process of Türk Traktör between 1948 and 1963: a critique of 'modernization' as development in Early Cold War Turkey

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Beginning with the Marshall Plan, the political and economic strategies of the United States shaped Turkey's modernization desires. Modernization was reflected in various urban and spatial applications, such as the building of new factories, dams, and highways constructed with American capital and service. Turkey's first tractor factory, established in 1954 with an American partner, Minneapolis-Moline, offers productive grounds for research that addresses modernization discourses on the 'Western' development models of the period. The tractor factory was opened in the building of a formerly aircraft engine factory in Atatürk Forest Farm representing modernization programme of the young Republic. This change from production of aircraft engines to the production of tractors represents a shift in the modernization paradigm from early Republican period to the Cold War Turkey. The establishment process of a tractor factory was in line with technological developments in agriculture, which had a role in urbanization in accordance with both industrialization and reduction of the rural workforce in developed Western countries such as the US. However, this multidisciplinary study highlights the rural and urbanization contradictions of Turkey and the dynamics of the period regarding the dilemma of modernization as development.

Modernization envisaged the provision of economic development and sociospatial well-being in an ever-urbanizing world for non-Western societies during the Cold War. In this context, 'modernization' was widely used with the same meanings as 'industrialization' and 'development'.¹ Early Cold War Turkey from the late 1940s to the early 1960s was shaped by such politico-economic strategies of the United States (US) and domestic dynamics. Still, this period provides a critical lens for interpreting modernization as a development paradigm through the politics of agricultural enhancement with more industrious methods and subsequent understanding of urbanization in Turkey example. Modernization was executed not only as importing machinery, establishing new firms and factories in Turkish cities but also as different urban layouts in the forms of educational institutions,² public transportation systems,³ chain hotels and highways.⁴ Turkey's first tractor factory, established in Ankara in 1954 with the partnership of an American multinational, Minneapolis-Moline (MM), offers productive grounds for research that touches on modernization discourses as Western models of the period. The tractor factory was opened in the building of a formerly aircraft engine factory in the state farm,⁵ Atatürk Forest Farm (AFF) representing

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¹Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study."

²Erdim, "Under the Flags of the Marshall Plan."

³Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*.

⁴Gönlüğü, "Consumer Democracy and the Emotional Investment"; Adalet, *Hotels and Highways*.

⁵İmamoğlu, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Endüstri Mirası Havaçılık Sanayi Yapıları."

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modernization programme of the young Republic.⁶ This change from production of aircraft engines to the production of tractors also represents a shift in the modernization paradigm from early Republican period to the Cold War Turkey which is a shift from industrial to agricultural development.

Tractors have had a particularly iconic role in terms of the reduction of human labour in agriculture in developed countries. For example, from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, the US launched heavy tractorization programmes to cultivate lands efficiently and the total number of tractors reached 4.3 million in 1954.⁷ Compared to previous decades, such a leap in agricultural approaches enhanced total production (fertilizer use, promotion of more lands for cultivation, etc.) and reduced the number of farm workers as well as the necessary size of the workforce. Following such developments in rural areas, the cumulative workforce tended to move to the industrial centres of the US, contributing to urbanization.⁸ On the other hand, developing countries had different experiences with similar processes. In addition to needing to import these machines from industrialized states, they faced the challenge of fostering a healthy climate for the adaptation and increasing of agricultural production in macroeconomic terms as a reflection of the modernization programme. In general, following a rapid modernization programme by imitating Western dynamics would positively contribute to economic development; however, it would not result in similar effects for rural and urban industrialization. From an agricultural perspective, the increased number of tractors and interdependently new techniques in agricultural production impacted the rural labour force;⁹ however, labour scarcity could not be expected to arise from nonagricultural growth in the near future as a driving force of mechanization.¹⁰ Limitations in mechanization would hamper the urbanization rates as well as ways of urbanization. To that extent, Turkey attempted to ‘modernize’ itself by adopting a Western type of developmentalist approach and new urban layouts as a developing state exemplify the dynamics of the Early Cold War period. As a part of these dynamics, tractors were represented as icons of modernization as development by American financial advisors and officials residing in Turkey and Turkish political actors during the establishment process of the first Turkish tractor factory. However, as a relatively less industrialized and less agriculturally enhanced society, Turkey’s initial imports and production attempts of tractors did not lead to similar results with developed economies. Top-down applications of modernization, through the Marshall Plan, and not giving enough time to cultural settlement neither sufficiently mechanized agriculture in Turkey in the 1950s nor helped the first tractor manufacturing factory to stay in the Turkish market. Firstly, developed Western economies that suffered greatly from the war could stand back on their feet with such aid. One of the most significant agricultural production exporters, Holland’s, return to the international market in the mid-1950s could be a good example of this situation. Secondly, arrival of more tractors to the Turkish market did not help emergence of a peasantry who effectively used these machines in agriculture. Most of these machines remained in the great landowners’ hands and were used in limited cultivation areas.

This paper gives the Americanization reference in the Early Cold War Era, starting from 1948 when the Marshall Fund was applied to Turkey. Since the referred period captures the production

⁶Çavdar Sert, “Tangible and Intangible Values.”

⁷US Census Bureau, *United States Census of Agriculture 1954*, 105.

⁸Binswanger, “Agricultural Mechanization,” 27–28.

⁹Karpat, *The Gecekondu*; Tekeli, *Bağımlı Kentleşme*; Şenyapılı, *Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu*; Şenyapılı, *Gecekondu*; Erman, “Becoming ‘Urban’ or Remaining ‘Rural’.”

¹⁰Binswagner, “Agricultural Mechanization,” 50.

of the notion of reconstruction through several acts, exchanges, and mobilities under the Marshall Fund between the US and its European allies, it also aimed to construct and modernize less developed states like Turkey. The Marshall Plan had the motivations of modernization and upgrade democracy, secularization, and development in terms of the built environment. Therefore, modernism understanding of Turkey was under the influence of urbanization in the 1950s.¹¹ The Democrat Party (DP) government labelled establishing new urban layouts such as highways, factories, dams – development-oriented construction projects in general, as progressive developments. By definition, architects and urban planners should play prominent roles in reconstructing the Turkish state and cities with visible concrete structures, which would be the most obvious representation of modernization. This understanding was also related to Americanization influence among the DP leaders. After the Marshall Plan funds paved the way for financing costly construction projects in Turkey, the DP government continued to carry the torch in the 1950s to design a ‘Little America’ from Turkey.¹² The American ideal was also formed as a structural enhancement and it became a symbol of technical perfection, precision, and progress.¹³ However, they soon started to be criticized as the ills of capitalist relations and urban land speculation through political struggle, which could not offer lasting urbanization of state, cities, and society, especially after the DP’s fall in 1960. The narrative of Turkey’s first tractor factory, in terms of its urban expectations and failures, presents a good example of the decade’s controversy.

In this context, this article explores the ascent of American economic influence over Turkey from 1948 to 1954 by centralizing tractor as a modernization icon and the establishment narratives of the Minneapolis-Moline Turkish Tractor Factory (a.k.a. Türk Traktör) from 1954 to 1963. After nine years of production, Minneapolis-Moline decided to leave the partnership in 1963. As a multidisciplinary study juxtaposing macroeconomic and urban planning histories, this article argues that the narratives of the tractor factory reveal the contradictions and dynamics of modernization through developmentalism in a Turkish case study.

In the next section of this paper, the literature on the early Cold War period Turkey in relation to modernization as development is briefly examined. The following section concentrates on the Marshall Plan to place the establishment of Turkey’s first tractor factory process starting within the Marshall Plan and growing American influence after 1948 into an environmental, cultural, and economic context. The third section examines changing economic and urban conditions of Turkey between the period 1948 and 1954 including a specific part on the planning of the tractor factory in AFF. This section (planlamaya dair bizi aydınlatıyor.) The final section captures MM’s initial productive years from 1954 to 1963 until the firm decided to leave the partnership. The methodology is primarily driven by analysis of archival materials and primary sources providing narratives of the process and factory. These archives include personal memoirs, papers, and memorandums of the notable American and Turkish financial and political actors. Various state documents from Turkish and American archives have also been investigated. This collection of archival sources merits scholarly attention not only for being representative of foreign investment in Turkey in the early Cold War period but also for providing discursive narratives that ground modernization as a development paradigm eventually approving general ruralization and urbanization trajectories. Thus, this article expands the pool of primary sources while offering a new frame for future comparative studies on Cold War developmental dynamics and the paradigm of modernization as development.

¹¹Gürel, ed., *Mid-Century Modernism in Turkey*; Bozdoğan, “Turkey’s Postwar Modernism.”

¹²Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, 88.

¹³Bozdoğan, “Turkey’s Postwar Modernism,” 19.

Literature review: modernization as development and the tractor factory

How modernization is conceptualized in relation to different localities is still under discussion in attempts to interpret the contradictions of the Cold War Era. ‘Modernization’ in general terms implies multiple processes of social change. Although the historical background of the Western-style modernizing of cities goes back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,¹⁴ the proximate and global origins of the idea of modernization as development lie in the history of the Cold War. The Cold War production of the notion of modernization was directed toward the capitalist development of non-Western societies,¹⁵ including non-colonial nation-states like Turkey.

Modernization as interrelated political, economic, and ideological processes in early Cold War Turkey has been widely explored by scholars with variable focuses. In this global historiography, Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör scrutinize local experiences and ideological, social, and cultural linkages of the Cold War in Turkey, which was at the centre of both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.¹⁶ There is also a strong link between manifestations of ideologies and the production of the ‘modern’ environment, which is another part of the cultural historiography of the Cold War. The relevant literature, therefore, could be further narrowed down to look at juxtapositions of urbanization and the modernization paradigm. Sibel Bozdoğan and Meltem Ö. Gürel elaborated on Turkey’s Cold War modernization, extending the issue of nation-building into the global trajectories of the era and addressing the ways in which bureaucracy and politics are implicitly and explicitly impactful in the built environment, in both architecture and urbanism, specifically after the establishment of the Marshall Plan.¹⁷ From a similar standpoint, Burak Erdim discussed the building of a university campus in Ankara, that of Middle East Technical University (METU) initiated with the Marshall Plan, between 1950 and 1964, and elaborated on the campus as a part of global modernisms and a spatial project for placing international experts in Turkey in the making of ‘Modern Turkey’.¹⁸ In relation to these prominent works, Emre Gönlügür examined the socio-spatial history of the İstanbul Hilton Hotel not only as an example of modern architecture of the era but also as a part of the discursive reproduction of modernization and negotiation of social change in postwar Turkey.¹⁹ In this context, Begüm Adalet’s *Hotels and Highways* is one of the latest scholarly attempts at unfolding Turkey’s Cold War dynamics by linking it with American agents in the production of knowledge of ‘modernization’. Adalet carefully unpacks how foreign scholars conceptualized modernization by conducting scientific research and narrating the economic development process of Turkey during the Cold War. In her narrative, urban layouts were not simply meant to integrate the national economy but venues where subjects could develop ‘modern’ relationships to machinery, time, and mobility.²⁰ Infrastructural projects were important sites in the construction of developmental thought, as well as machinery and the willingness to adopt new agricultural techniques were crucial indices in assembling the notion of rural underdevelopment.²¹

These studies primarily illuminate the material production and discursive reproduction of modernization through the Marshall Plan, highlighting its premises of development. They shed light on

¹⁴Çelik, *The Remaking of İstanbul*.

¹⁵Tipps, “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study,” 199.

¹⁶Örnek and Üngör, eds., *Turkey in the Cold War*. Their edited book brings together different studies on assorted cultural events and actions such as propaganda activities and exhibitions.

¹⁷Bozdoğan, “Turkey’s Postwar Modernism,” 9.

¹⁸Erdim, *Landed Internationals*; Erdim, “Under the Flags.”

¹⁹Gönlügür, “Consumer Democracy.”

²⁰Adalet, *Hotels and Highways*.

²¹Thornburg et al., *Turkey, an Economic Appraisal*, 109; Adalet, 123.

linkages among the complex layers of Cold War modernization in Turkey, such as the mobility of foreign intellectuals and the establishment of new institutions. Although the scholarship is limited in terms of exploring industrial buildings, their planning histories, and establishment processes in Turkey, the establishment of the first tractor factory opens a space for further discussing how modernization as a development paradigm was manifested in Turkey's modernization expectations and their relation with modernization paradigms in line with 'modern' architecture or landscapes. However, the establishment process of the tractor factory as a part and parcel of the modernization programme is multi-faceted, including premises about both rural and urban development. Additionally, the planning of the tractor factory's location in the capital and in AFF is also important in terms of the dynamics of the period, which represents a rupture in the modernization paradigm from the early Republican period to Cold War Turkey and from industrial to agricultural development, will be elaborated in the following sections.²²

A narrative that comprehensively discusses the Marshall Plan, American-type modernization and its maturity in the post-World War II (WWII) period, Turkey's economic transformation in the late 1940s due to American influence, the role of tractors in this modernization model, and the establishment of the first Turkish tractor manufacturing factory with the help of American business will allow readers to trace this paper's main argument.

George Marshall's postwar plan

As representatives of the standing victor of the postwar period, American state institutions and businesses found abundant chances to apply their own modernization practices. While the European powers drained their resources and were economically exhausted by WWII, the US economy enjoyed production surpluses, especially for military machines and equipment. This boom in military production and accrued capital enabled the United States to launch new aid programmes such as the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall Plan of 1948 to enhance America's new role in international politics.

The establishment of an American economic model and attracting other states to share this model were crucial. The Marshall Plan was accordingly used to inject American capital, products, and services into circulation in the world's markets. This process eventually helped to reconstruct allied economies and build up liberal markets, preparing the best possible conditions for American businesses to take command of the overseas markets.²³ At the same time, the plan paved the way for American-type modernization to be theorized and executed as more urban layouts spatially in less developed countries. In other words, it reflected the production modes of the built environment with the premises of democracy, secularization, and development in terms of life quality.²⁴ American politicians and big business owners were ardent supporters of this interventionist policy in pursuit of creating a global Americanized society.²⁵

Unlike the capitalist Western European states, less developed participant in the plan, Turkey, was introduced to American tactics for a modernized state-building system with unleashed economic growth supported by know-how and engineering projects for better infrastructure, which James Scott critically labelled as 'high modernization' in *Seeing Like a State*.²⁶ In line with Scott,

²²İmamoğlu, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Endüstri Mirası Havacılık Sanayi Yapıları," 53–59.

²³Hogan, "American Marshall Plan Planners."

²⁴Adalet, *Hotels and Highways*.

²⁵Fossedal and Mikhail, "Marshall Plan Commemorative Section."

²⁶Scott, *Seeing Like a State*.

Michael Adas argued that American agents such as bureaucrats, businessmen, and other professionals were selling American virtues to less developed states via technological advancements after WWII, considering those values to be generally superior.²⁷ The ideals of modernization took root with the elimination of livelihoods based on ‘scraping by’ in other countries, with self-sufficiency being highly correlated with larger production volumes.²⁸ Committed since the New Deal (1933–1938) to a specific type of modernization that required state-supported, top-down mass production and urban projects, US institutions pursued the promotion of such projects overseas.²⁹

In this framework, American business circles and corporations also had significant roles in the post-WWII reconstruction era. They sold their products, established overseas branches, and reconstructed urban layouts. After gaining an invaluable place in the world markets with budgets in the millions of dollars, American businesses began identifying themselves as major powers in selling Americanism to the world, which helped these corporations find spots on US foreign and commercial policy agendas.³⁰ These circles enabled the spread of the American type of modernization for mutual prosperity among ‘America’s friends’.³¹ Being included in this plan since the beginning, Turkey was also experiencing changes in economic and urban conditions under the influence of modernization as a development paradigm.

The changing economic and urban framework of Turkey, 1948–1954

Both Republican People’s Party (RPP) and its successor DP foresaw the Marshall Plan as a ticket to launching heavy industrialization through mechanization, factories, and military equipment in 1949.³² Agricultural enhancement remained one of the most crucial areas for implementing the Marshall Plan in Turkey. In line with American advisors’ reports, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) identified Turkey as an agricultural country in the integrated world capitalist system. Improving agricultural production, irrigation systems, and infrastructure for better transportation of agricultural products to world markets were the initial targets of modernization as development provided by Marshall Plan.³³

Turkish goal was reaching the ‘level of contemporary civilization’ through heavy industrialization when, in fact, longer-term goals were required for an agricultural Turkey with limited efficient industrial institutions in the 1940s. On the agenda of American advisors, shaping a Turkey with enhanced agriculture and integration into allied markets was a realistic short-term achievement. As the benefactors, the Americans had the privilege of deciding how to apply these funds in Turkey. Turkey could modernize itself with American guidance and business only if it accepted the American terms.³⁴

Eventually, Turkey accepted the American type of modernization for several reasons. Having suffered financial blows due to reduced production and the loss of Germany as a trade and credit partner during the harsh war years, Turkey fell into an economic recession. Turkey also summoned

²⁷Adas, *Dominance by Design*.

²⁸Cullather, *The Hungry World*.

²⁹Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*.

³⁰Chandler and Mazlish, *Leviathans*.

³¹Wilkins, *The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise*; Economic Cooperation Administration, *3 Years of the Marshall Plan*; Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, 223–24.

³²Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*.

³³Turkey and Organization for International Economic Cooperation, *Marshall Plan in Turkey*, 21.

³⁴Iplikci, ‘Diplomacy and Business in Capable Hands,’ 56.

one million men to military service during the years of WWII, which crippled the economy by diverting resources and removing labour from the fields.³⁵ On top of these economic problems there were larger political issues. Turkey had been under Soviet influence in terms of modernization in the 1930s, prioritizing state initiatives and relying on Soviet credit, and it could have continued to follow this path in the postwar period. The Soviet Union, similarly to the Western-type modernization ideology, had an ambitious programme for enhancing agricultural production and combining such an achievement with social enlightenment to create a welfare state. As significant branches of the programme, industrialization through mechanization and urbanization were also prioritized. The Soviets did not use terms such as ‘modernization’ or ‘development’ in the same way as Western capitalists; Soviet engagement with developing states was shaped by its own dynamics.³⁶ However, worsening political relations in the postwar period ended Soviet aid led Turkey to adopt a new approach to modernization under American wings.

The RPP government opt to follow American terms because the Marshall Plan funds would help Turkey’s development, increase its agricultural production and foreign trade, and modernize the country with new urban layouts. Being on the same page, US expected more governmental coordination of trade, influential credit, and monetary and fiscal policies to provide an environment to attract private investment-domestic and foreign-to selected labour-intensive industries.³⁷ Starting a top-down development process, ECA officials offered to direct funds to construct a solid infrastructure network in Anatolia and sufficient technology to increase mineral and agricultural production.³⁸ Industrializing Turkey’s strengths, such as agricultural and mineral production, which could also increase its exports to the U.S. and Europe were the main targets. The general framework of the advice urged privatization; however, the elimination of all state initiatives or governmental inclusion in the agricultural and mining sectors, which would have been unrealistic. Privatization and the inviting of foreign investments should co-exist with state initiatives in Turkey.³⁹

In his first address to the GNA as the new prime minister, Menderes highlighted DP government’s agenda to pursue closer relations with the US and its institutions. The DP would continue focusing on agricultural industrialization, road building, and irrigation projects in line with the Americans’ advice. Menderes further announced in that the state would gradually withdraw from business and mining sectors to make room for private capital. The SOEs would be replaced with foreign private enterprises and the Turkish business elite.⁴⁰ To benefit more from American capital and technical capabilities, the DP government would work on developing a better legal basis to lure private investors to the market.⁴¹

The arrival of Marshall Plan aid and credits empowered American actors to join the decision-making processes of modernization projects. Çağlar Keyder states that after receiving funding in the form of American aid controlled by American chief executives, Turkey’s aim of modernization through industrial development were replaced with agricultural enhancement.⁴² Aiming to make Turkey a granary for the alliance and believing that rural development would be a more realistic goal, American actors first convinced the Turkish government to approve this pattern of development and then introduced American agricultural goods and machines to the Turkish market. The

³⁵Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 13.

³⁶Kalinovsky, “Tractors, Power Lines, and the Welfare State,” 564.

³⁷Maxfield and Nolt, “Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital,” 69–70.

³⁸Thornburg et al., *Turkey, an Economic Appraisal*, 4.

³⁹Economic Mission to Turkey, *The Economy of Turkey*, 149.

⁴⁰Journal of TBMM Records, 9th Parliament, Vol.1, May 29, 1950, 26.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 31–32.

⁴²Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, 150.

Americans advised no more clumsy economic statism, the elimination of ineffective state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the transition to a liberal economy via privatization, focusing on the country's strengths.⁴³ The influence of these actors continued to dominate and shape Turkish economic, scientific, and modernization as development paradigm into the next decade, as well.⁴⁴

As mentioned above, planning cities was another dimension of Turkey's modernization such as building roads and dams and ensuring that electrification was extended to agricultural fields for higher productivity rates.⁴⁵ The Marshall Plan arrangements accelerated the construction of modern roadways with the help of the US Bureau of Public Roads. The plan was to build a transportation network across Anatolia that would encompass all market centres, mines, and natural resources and tie them to the commercial ports.⁴⁶ For better irrigation and to avoid destruction of crops by floods, a project to build a dam on the Seyhan River was launched in March 1947.⁴⁷ The ECA controlled all allocations, American engineers led the projects, and American products were widely utilized in the process. They helped build 'American' prestige in the market.

After convincing Turkey to modernize its agricultural production, many American firms such as Federal Motor Trucks, American Fertilizer Co., and International Harvester Co. entered the Turkish market to provide tractors and artificial fertilizers as well as offering services and products to support modern agricultural techniques. Turkish agriculture was overly dependent on hand power and manual work; mechanization was scarce and mostly insufficient. Therefore, agriculture received the largest portion of the aid at 21%. The total agricultural aid earmarked for Turkey reached \$64 million in the first four years of the Marshall Plan.⁴⁸ Imports of thousands of tractors and tons of fertilizer were generally covered by these funds, together with service and construction costs.⁴⁹

According to World Bank's American executive visited Turkey James M. Barker's 1951 report, the number of tractors in Turkey reached 10,000 after having only been 3200 in 1949.⁵⁰ The American tractor business profited immensely from that expansion. Prioritizing American brands, the Marshall Plan opened the way for American goods – tractors, in this case – to be sold in Turkey. The Turkish market was filled with American products from Ford, Fordson Major, Caterpillar,

⁴³Thornburg et al., *Turkey, an Economic Appraisal*; Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey*.

⁴⁴Örnek, *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı & Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi*.

⁴⁵National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), "Confidential, Letter to Carter de Paul and James E. Victory from Russell H. Dorr," July 14, 1949; NARA, "Report About the Highway Situation in Turkey by American Highway Mission for Aid to Turkey," February 1948.

⁴⁶The project was launched with U.S. aid worth \$5 million, largely in the form of road construction equipment, and Turkey contributed 30 million Turkish lira, or approximately \$11 million at that time, to cover local needs. The project was predicted to complete 23,000 kilometers of roads by 1957. Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, *Yol Davamız*, 13; Also Adalet, *Hotels and Highways*.

⁴⁷In this ECA-funded project, three American companies shared the concession: Knappen Engineering Company, Morrison-Knudsen Company, and International Engineering Company. Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı (DAB) (Directorate of the National Archives), "Seyhan Nehri'nin ıslahı için, Knappen-Engineering Company ve International-Engineering Company şirketleri ile görüşmeler yapılması," March 27, 1947. Koppers Company Inc. undertook the construction of two new docks, a large breakwater, additional railroads, new stations leading to the Zonguldak mines, and a port on the Black Sea in the early 1950s. All of this construction was expected to cost \$50 million, and most of the operations would be financed through ECA aid. Highlights of these American projects were the Sarıyar Dam project completed by International Engineering Company and the application of Stone and Webster Corporation to oversee the power supply for Northwest Anatolia. Knappen submitted a report on the development of the Gediz Valley near İzmir. Furthermore, International Engineering was waiting for a grant from the RPP government to construct a dam on the Seyhan River to improve the irrigation of the fertile Adana plains. James M. Barker Papers, "Robinson, Richard D., 1950–1951," April 7, 1950. As an extension of these projects, the U.S. Rubber Company also indirectly joined in for the manufacturing of conveyor belts in the mines. Lignite mines were electrified by the General Electric Company-Koc partnership, which agreed to work together to build a light bulb factory in İstanbul with ECA sponsorship in 1950. Turkish Information Office, "Turkey's Foreign Trade – News From Turkey (NFT) 1948–49"; NFT, "Turkish-American Industrial Cooperation," February 9, 1950; NFT, "Industry," November 18, 1948.

⁴⁸Turkey and Organization for International Economic Cooperation, 9–10.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰DAB, "Barker Misyon Raporu," August 21, 1951.

Oliver, MM, John Deere, and McCormick in the 1950s.⁵¹ To reduce the costs of spare parts and repairs, the ECA required that these firms establish repair shops and assembly lines for spare parts in Turkey.⁵²

In macroeconomic terms, economic indicators such as agricultural production, extracted volumes in mining, mechanization, percentage of cultivated areas, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were on the rise at this time.⁵³ Improvement of the state's landscape through roads and infrastructure programmes and enhancement of agriculture with dam and irrigation projects were embraced by both the RPP and the public. While not abandoning statism entirely, the RPP was convinced to ease restrictions on private initiatives as well as foreign investments in 1949.⁵⁴

The dramatic increment in agricultural production volumes and the accompanying profit enhanced the popularity of the US among Turkish government and the agrarian majority. The RPP and its emerging opponent since 1946, the DP, both included privatization and liberal economic propaganda in their party agendas for the upcoming elections of 1950. Both parties emphasized that they would work with American advisors to bring more American capital, products, services, and firms to Turkey if they were elected.⁵⁵ Expecting more of the same, the people put the DP into power with the elections of 1950 and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes would long champion the liberal economy. Another capitalist, President Celal Bayar, remarked in his presidential address to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) on 1 November 1950, that a new liberal economic model that valued private initiatives would be secured through laws.⁵⁶ The ECA was proud to see the changing economic perspective and growing trust in American methods in Turkey and predicted that this pro-American and liberal government would ease their work.⁵⁷

Between 1950 and 1952, Turkey enjoyed the ongoing privileges of being funded by American capital and products, making profits through these funds' surpluses while having no concerns about long-term credit repayments. However, after the Marshall Plan came to an end in 1952, the DP needed a new plan to ensure that the progress would not slow down. Attracting foreign direct investment was always on the government's agenda, touted as the most convenient way to sustain economic progress and modernization without debt.⁵⁸ Benefitting immensely from American multinationals' products and services, the DP government hoped to keep those benefits and enacted privatization laws to encourage foreign investments in 1951 and 1954. Another law to open Turkey's most sacred industry, oil, to foreign investors was enacted in 1954.⁵⁹ These laws provided the same rights to foreign investors as to Turkish ones, abolishing limits on the sectors that foreign investors could enter,⁶⁰ with this legal change being reflected in the *New York Times* (Figure 1).

Planning of the tractor factory in AFF

Long before being a capital, Ankara had been one of the most important cities of the Ottoman Empire. However, it was negatively affected by the unfortunate regression of the wool trade and

⁵¹European Recovery Program, *Turkey: Country Study*, 73.

⁵²Journal of TBMM Records, April 16, 1951, 203–6.

⁵³Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, 431–34.

⁵⁴Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), "(Harriman) to (Hoffman), January 6, 1949."

⁵⁵Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey*, 53.

⁵⁶Journal of TBMM Records, November 1, 1950.

⁵⁷Carver, "A Correct and Progressive Road," 88.

⁵⁸Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, 87.

⁵⁹Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, 138–39.

⁶⁰Hangen, "Turkey Will Spur Inflow of Capital," January 17, 1954.

TURKEY WILL SPUR INFLOW OF CAPITAL: LAW TO BE PASSED THIS WEEK WILL ...

By WELLES HANGEN Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
New York Times (1923-Current file); Jan 17, 1954;
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times with Index
 pg. 26

TURKEY WILL SPUR INFLOW OF CAPITAL

Law to Be Passed This Week
Will Let Investors Take All
Profits Out of Country

By WELLES HANGEN
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ANKARA, Turkey, Jan. 16 — Turkey is about to move to forge a modern industrial economy by attracting foreign private capital. Early next week the Grand National Assembly, Turkey's unicameral legislature, is expected to enact a law opening industry, agriculture and commerce to foreign private investors and authorizing them to take home up to 100 per cent of their net profits, dividends and capital base. The measure is a step in Turkey's progressive abandonment of the autarchic economic policies that have held sway throughout much of the world since the depression of the Nineteen Thirties. It was prepared with the active support and collaboration of United States authorities. Late in 1952 George C. McGhee, then United States Ambassador, and Leo M. Dayton, chief of the economic aid mission here, proposed to Washington that all possible means be used to encourage Turkey to open her potentially rich economy to foreign private capital.

Officials in Washington endorsed the idea as a "pilot project" to test the feasibility of the theory that private investment could be attracted in sufficient volume from the United States and other industrial countries to fill the gap left by termination of direct American economic aid. Turkey's new investment law received its principal impetus from the visit here last year by a private investment mission sponsored by the Foreign Operations Administration and headed by Clarence B. Randall, chairman of President Eisenhower's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy.

Provisions of New Law

As proposed by Mr. Randall and drafted by the Turkish Government, the measure contains the following main provisions:

¶ Foreign investors may engage on a basis of equality with Turkish business men in any enterprise that will "tend to promote economic development of the country."

¶ All profits, dividends and proceeds of the sale of capital assets of foreign enterprises realized after Dec. 31, 1953, may be transferred abroad at the prevailing official rate exchange.

¶ The Turkish Ministry of Finance guarantees convertibility of dividends and proceeds from the sale of stock sold abroad by Turkish corporations financed with foreign capital, thus making possible the listing of Turkish securities on foreign exchanges for the first time.

¶ Restrictions on employment

of foreign technicians, managers and other aliens in private concerns are lifted and such persons are authorized to convert part of their earnings into currency of their country of origin.

A previous law of Aug. 7, 1951,

forbade transfer abroad of more than 10 per cent of annual profits, dividends and interest and restricted foreign private investors to fields of "industry, power, mining, public works, communications and tourism."

General Electric, Squibb, the Fertilizer Corporation of America and certain other foreign concerns have set up branch plants here under this measure, but the total foreign capital to enter Turkey since enactment of the law has amounted to only 14,558,000 liras (\$5,199,285).

The Turks expect that the main inflow of foreign capital will be in industries to process domestic raw materials. Mineral refining, power development and utilization of the abundant cotton crop appear to offer the most attractive possibilities.

Ten foreign petroleum companies or groups now conducting preliminary geological surveys here will come under a special law drafted by the Turks with the help of Max Ball, an American oil consultant. This measure, being considered in a committee of the Assembly, provides for a fifty-fifty split of net profits between the exploiting companies and the Government. The Government's share will include 12.5 per cent of the crude petroleum extracted by the producers.

Applications under the new general investment law will be passed upon by a special control commission, which must render a decision in fifteen days. Appeals can be made to a three-man ministerial committee, whose verdict will be final.

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Figure 1. Welles Hangen, 'Turkey Will Spur Inflow of Capital', *New York Times*, January 17, 1954.

a great fire occurred in 1916. Within the establishment of the new nation-state in 1923, the young government started to make investments in Ankara together with sociospatial reforms to produce a modern city as the capital of Republic of Turkey. Ankara's economic welfare had significantly changed through these investments. Therefore, the establishment year of the Republic, 1923 is a key for Ankara.⁶¹ More and above, Ankara was expected to represent the progressive features of Turkish modernization and republican revolution in the 1920s and 1930s. It was representing a modern, self-sufficient, secular society through especially public spaces, which prompted both Kemal Atatürk and government to focus on improving Ankara as a worthy capital city. Hence in the first two decades of the republic, the city was planned by various actors including planners, architects, and artists some of whom were forced to immigrate from Europe such as Germany and Australia as a result of Nazi Party pressure. Under these circumstances, the first two plans of the capital city were shaped through the works of Carl Christopher Lörcher and Hermann Jansen; the former worked on Ankara City Plan between 1923 and 1929; and the latter between 1929 and 1939.⁶² The first two plans could be considered within the efforts for creating a comprehensive programme and a modern city. Although main character of the city centres were developed, these two plans

⁶¹Kaçar, "Ankara, a Small Town, Transformed to a Nation's Capital," 44.

⁶²Cengizkan, "1957 Yücel-Ubaydın İmar Planı ve Ankara Şehir Mimarisi," 27.

were not expecting the upcoming population raise. Urban population was rapidly increasing depending on rural to urban migration in the late 1940s. The third governmental urban plan, Yücel-Uybadın Ankara Plan, went into operation as a winner project of city planning competition in 1957. As well as the first two plans, Yücel-Uybadın Ankara Plan was not offering efficient programmes on urban problems such as the rapid expansion of the urban fabric through informal settlements and the increasing infrastructural and social problems.⁶³ Although these projects to produce a modern city failed to deliver the desired results, the story of AFF had a specific place in Ankara's urban plan.

The planning of a state farm, AFF, was an isperable part of the establishment of Ankara as a capital. The establishment process started as an individual initiative of Atatürk, but it was later transformed into a public property. Its establishment signifies the importance of agriculture and agricultural labour which links the agriculture with modern urbanization policies of republican revolution and modernism understanding of the founding years of the Republic. The farm was considered as a republican, national, modern landscape which once provided both agricultural and industrial production and training areas as well as socialising spaces for the citizens of the capital.⁶⁴

The history of tractor factory's location and building in AFF goes back on the first decades of the republic when large-scale industrial initiatives were founded such as Türk Hava Kurumu (Turkish Aeronautical Association) in association with foreign technical experts who had to immigrate to Turkey. Having an ambitious programme, Türk Hava Kurumu first established an aircraft factory named Etimesgut Aircraft Factory in Etimesgut, a district of Ankara in 1942. Secondly, the institution designed an aircraft engine factory in 1942, and executed in AFF in 1948.⁶⁵ However, with the Marshall Plan, there had been an intensive shift to agricultural development as elaborated in the former sections, and the aircraft industry was suddenly abandoned.⁶⁶ The second aircraft factory had once hosted the production and repair of aircraft engines in AFF for a short period, transferred to Türk Tractor in 1954.⁶⁷ The multi-component modernization paradigm of the republican revolution in the 1920s and 1930s was transformed into the modernization paradigm of agricultural production as development in early Cold War Turkey in the 1940s. Nevertheless, in keeping with the changing aspects, the factory now focused on assembling tractors, an important part of the agricultural development model. Despite the change in business, it is possible to state that AFF still played an important role in Ankara's modernization plan in the 1950s (Figure 2).

'Buy tractor': Minneapolis-Moline on the scene, 1954–1963

Turkey's modernization attempts through the Marshall Plan and the establishment of a tractor factory as an addition to the urban layout were seen as symbols of national development, especially by the government of the era, the DP government. The process of establishing the first tractor factory necessitated negotiation with the public through propaganda. In this context, American and Turkish media platforms represented tractors as a departure point for modernization and a method of development during the Cold War.⁶⁸ The application of development economics via the Marshall Plan brought thousands of tractors and fertilizer into the Turkish market. These materials linked

⁶³Günay, "Ankara Çekirdek Alanının Oluşumu ve 1990 Nazım Planı Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme," 81.

⁶⁴Keskinok, "Atatürk Orman Çiftliği: Bir Özgürleşme Tasarısı." Çavdar Sert, "Tangible and Intangible Values of Atatürk Forest Farm as a Heritage of Ideas."

⁶⁵İmamoğlu, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Endüstri Mirası Havacılık Sanayi Yapıları," 54.

⁶⁶Ibid., 57.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Bengi and Zat, "Gavur Öküzü," 128–33.



Figure 2. Ankara Forest Farm, 1967. Motor Fabrikası (aircraft engine factory) turned into, Türk Tractor. Koç University, VEKAM Ankara Map and Plan Archive. Inventory No: H087.

and tasked Turkey within the capitalist cycle in line with the US administration's expectations.⁶⁹ Both Atatürk and Menderes, an agrarian land-owner, and the public also referred to such developments conceptualized as modernization and viewed the tractor as a key figure en route to progress. Once cited as the master of the nation by Atatürk himself, the Turkish peasantry was now seen as an 'underdeveloped' society that needed to embrace its duties on the path to modernization.⁷⁰ While the DP deputies were campaigning for tractors and tying national modernization goals to mechanization,⁷¹ notable intellectuals such as Ahmet Muhip Dıranas and Kemal Karpat underlined the significance of tractors and the developmentalist perspective in rural modernization.⁷²

For sustaining modernization including agricultural industrialization, Turkey accepted applications from American multinationals after 1954. American truck and tractor manufacturers such as MM, Federal Motor Truck, and Willys-Overland Motors received state permits to construct manufacturing plants and gain a share of this profitable market. Turkey, in turn, enjoyed the idea of receiving yet more tractors with fewer costs incurred thanks to domestic assembly and production⁷³ (Figures 3 and 4).

⁶⁹Tören, "Yeniden Yapılanan Dünya Ekonomisinde Marshall Planı ve Türkiye Uygulaması," 2.

⁷⁰Yıldırım, "Developmentalism and Rural Sociology."

⁷¹Bengi and Zat, "Gavur Öküzü," 129.

⁷²Ibid., 130; Karpat, "Köy Kalkınmasının Esasları."

⁷³Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey*, Vol. 1, 6-7, 37.

Among these American brands, MM enjoyed an important role in Turkey as the first tractor assembly line funded by an American multinational corporation and Turkish business circles. In line with the explanations of Harvard-trained economist Richard D. Robinson, the DP government approved MM's investment plan for Turkey, constructing a plant to manufacture its tractors in 1954. Turkey's most notable machinery SOE, Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi (MKE) (Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation), was selected to partner with MM in this initiative.⁷⁴ However, this partnership was a necessity. MKE has already shut down its operations in 1952 and its facility, which was established in AFF long ago⁷⁵, was idle since then. A Turkish engineer trained in Robert College called Jirayr Istanbulu renovated the idle facility as a replica of the Minneapolis-Moline's original facility in Minnesota.⁷⁶

MM Türk Tractor was jointly established through the partnership of MM and several Turkish investors such as Ziraat Bank, Tarış, and MKE. This joint effort benefited from recently enacted Law No. 6224 on privatization. Having a majority in the GNA, DP deputies had approved that law on 18 January 1954. Accordingly, foreign investors could gain access to any market available to Turkish investors. Foreign multinationals could transfer employees and products without restrictions or tariffs, and all profits made in Turkey could be transferred out of the country.⁷⁷ MM was granted 25 years of operation and its initial capital was 20 million Turkish lira.⁷⁸ Furthermore, until the company achieved domestic manufacturing abilities without needing foreign aid or spare parts, its imports would be exempted from taxation.⁷⁹ Opening the facility in early 1955, MM set high expectations and announced its first-year goal as manufacturing 2000 tractors (Figures 5–8).

The establishment of this facility brought many key actors together, such as Vecdi Diker, Head of the Turkish General Directorate of Highways; Orville Freeman, US Secretary of Agriculture and former governor of Minnesota, the home state of MM; and Thomas Dewey, who had been hired as a lobbyist by the DP government.⁸⁰ Diker, as an American-trained Turkish bureaucrat, not only took part in the agricultural enhancement of Turkey and the expansion of infrastructure projects such as highways but also became one of the board members of MM Türk Tractor after its establishment. According to Ahmet Binbir, a former MM employee, Diker's personal connections with Freeman from his days in the US helped facilitate MM's investments in the facility and the partnership.⁸¹ However, despite being a significant facility with key staff, MM employed only 180 people in 1955.⁸²

Completing the first work year, MM manufactured 700 tractors, below the original expectations.⁸³ The partners of the initiative were not disappointed by the failure to reach the first-year target; all were aware that direct investments require longer periods to reach maturity. MM

⁷⁴DAB, "MKE Kurumu Motor Fabrikası ile bu fabrikaya ait tesislerin kurulacak olan Minneapolis-Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri AŞ'ne satılması," June 20, 1954.

⁷⁵Kacar, *Kültür/Mekan: Gazi Orman Çiftliği*.

⁷⁶Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi*, 19; Milliyet, "Traktör Fabrikası Faaliyete Geçiyor," November 13, 1954.

⁷⁷Law No. 6224, a.k.a. "Yabancı Sermayeyi Teşvik Kanunu.;" Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954*.

⁷⁸DAB, "Merkezi Ankara olmak üzere Minneapolis-Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri AŞ'nin kurulmasına izin verilmesi," July 25, 1954.

⁷⁹DAB, "Minneapolis-Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri AŞ'nin Dış yardıma ihtiyaç olmadan üretime geçeceği tarihe kadar dış kredi, ana para vefaizlerine Maliye Vekaleti'nce kefalet verilmesi," August 17, 1954.

⁸⁰Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi*, 33.

⁸¹Ibid., 34.

⁸²Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi*, 25.

⁸³Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey, Vol. 4*, 370.



Figure 3. Türk Tractor Factory, Ankara, Turkey. Source: Metin Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi* [The History of Türk Tractor Factory] (Ankara: Fersa, 2004).

accordingly aimed to expand the plant's capacity by 1960 by hiring more Turkish personnel and manufacturing domestic tractors (Figure 9).

The economic recession that began affecting the Turkish economy in 1956 had a direct negative impact on MM's business. Lacking sufficient currency to import spare parts, MM also fell into financial trouble. The manufacturing process was still slow, remaining below expectations.⁸⁴ Economic hardships and reductions in the company's financial resources stalled the manufacturing

⁸⁴DAB, "Minneapolis-Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makinaları AŞ'nin Başbakan'a yazdığı yazı," November 8, 1957.




Figure 4. Türk Tractor Factory in the Yenimahalle district of Ankara. Background map produced with, Snazzy Maps and Google Maps. The factory was first built to produce aircraft engines in 1948; however, it was turned into a tractor factory in 1954. Source: Metin Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi*, [The History of Türk Tractor Factory] (Ankara: Fersa, 2004), 21–4.

progress; with each passing year, harsh economic conditions continued to detract MM from its objectives. In 1958, tractor prices were still unaffordable for millions of peasants and the plant in Ankara was able to manufacture at most 30% of a unit.⁸⁵ MM finally decided to withdraw from the Turkish market in 1963.⁸⁶

In this process, there was a discursive production of modernization as a development project. Tractors became the very first icon of development, manifested as a sign of common wealth (Figure 10). MM's arrival to the Turkish market could be a convincing macroeconomic and political success along Turkey's path to 'modernization as development'. However, it could not manufacture enough tractors for public utilization and reduce its prices. MM tractors were sold for 16,000 Turkish lira, equivalent then to \$3200. This new price was still quite high for the average Turkish peasant. Ironically, the tractor was to be manufactured for use by the agricultural masses; however, these people were far from able to afford the costly machines. Therefore, 'buy a tractor' advertisements never targeted the rural population as their audiences.

⁸⁵ Journal of TBMM Records, March 28, 1958.

⁸⁶ DAB, "Minneapolis-Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makinaları AŞ'nin durumu hakkında rapor ve Türk Traktör Fabrikası hakkında kısa özet," April 5, 1962.

Moline Project Set for Start in Turkey

Minneapolis-Moline tractors familiar to American industry will start rolling out of a factory in Turkey around the middle of January.

This was reported today by Warren C. MacFarlane, Jr., vice president of Minneapolis-Moline, who spent a month in Turkey inspecting preparations for the new plant.

It will be the first tractor factory in Turkey, and Minneapolis-Moline is the first firm going into that nation under a new foreign investment encouragement act.

MacFarlane returned full of enthusiasm for the project and of praise for Turkish industrial progress. He said the Turks and peoples of nearby nations are watching the project with deep interest.

A Turkish company has been established, and Minneapolis-Moline is furnishing the "know-how" and use of its farm implement patents. MacFarlane said three Minneapolis men have been assigned to the project, and from 10 to 15 others will be placed on the payroll of the Turkish firm,

The three are William F. Foss, managing director; Arthur W. Huff, general sales manager, and J. L. Collins, general plant superintendent,



MacFarlane

GRANDMA, 34, HAS TRIPLETS

HOMINY, OKLA. — (P) — Mrs. Cecil Morgan, a 34-year-old grandmother, gave birth to triplet girls Wednesday, increasing her family to nine children.

The astounded father, a laborer, exclaimed: "What in the world am I going to do with them?"

The mother's oldest daughter, Mrs. C. M. Vandever, 16, is the parent on one child and is expecting another.

Crusade of Food Urged by CARE

A "food crusade" to send part of the American food surplus to the needy in crucial

Figure 5. 'Moline Project Set for Start in Turkey', *The Minneapolis Star*, December 23, 1954. Most of the parts and the bodies of the tractors would be imported from plants in the United States and the, assembly would be completed in the factory in Turkey. MM promised a \$2.142 million capital, investment in the economic dimension, which would reduce the initial costs. Initial projections did not, meet the demands. The lack of currency negatively affected the imports of spare parts and the factory, was only able to manufacture 700 tractors at the beginning.

Executives Report Moline Plant in Turkey Turns Out 700 Tractors

By LEONARD INSKIP
Minneapolis Tribune Staff Writer

Seven months ago last week proud Turkish workmen and officials watched the first tractor roll off the assembly line at the Minneapolis-Moline Turk Traktor Co. plant near Ankara.

Last week the 700th tractor was on its way to a Turkish wheat farm.

Meanwhile, two top American officials of the Turkish company were in Minneapolis to report to executives of Minneapolis-Moline Co. on progress at the plant.

Minneapolis-Moline owns 30 per cent of the Turkish firm and provides it with management and technical know-how.

The two officials were William F. Foss, top executive officer, and Arthur W. Huff, general sales manager. Both formerly were on Minneapolis-Moline's staff at Hopkins.

Here are some of the highlights of their report:

Sales volume of tractors and implements assembled at the Turkish plant this year will total between five and seven million dollars, next year between 10 and 15 million dollars.

The company currently is operating at a profit.

Major problem is foreign exchange. Turkey is unable to export enough to earn abroad all the dollar or sterling credits necessary for purchase of machinery and parts.

Agreement has been reached with a Detroit, Mich., firm to design a 2½-million-dollar foundry. Foreign exchange difficulties will have to be cleared away



Foss Huff
Report on progress

before designing and purchase of equipment can proceed.

The firm, which won widespread publicity in Turkey for instituting a five-day work week, has gotten 5,000 job applications from Turks. Employment now is 158 (only 13 are Americans) and will be 300 next year.

THE COMPANY is adapting itself successfully to Turkish customs. Last month it even honored a Moslem religious holiday by slaughtering several lambs as is traditionally done in Turkey.

Foss summed up the Turkish venture this way: "Our opportunity is proving to be every bit as good as we hoped it would."

Foreign exchange difficulties, he said, are "our biggest single problem."

THIS IS BECAUSE almost all parts and equipment for tractors assembled in Turkey have to be purchased in the United States.

Turkey, a predominantly agricultural nation, has to export farm or farm-derived products to earn foreign credits abroad.

But its foreign market isn't great enough for it to earn all the credit it needs.

That was one reason Turkey's government passed a foreign investment encouragement law. Turkey wanted more industry so that Turkish labor and raw materials could be utilized.

Minneapolis-Moline was the first American company to take advantage of the law and join the Turkish government and private investors in establishing a plant.

BY THE END of next year Foss hopes that at least a quarter of the parts for each tractor will be manufactured in Turkey, but it is estimated that it will be several years before all the parts now made by Minneapolis-Moline in America can be made in Turkey.

And to do this will require a large Turkish foundry. The problem now is to get the foreign credit necessary to pay for its designing and manufacture.

The proposed foundry, with a capacity of 110 tons daily (as great as Minneapolis-Moline's Hopkins foundry), would have four times the capacity of any foundry now operating in Turkey.

FOSS SAID he is confident the foreign exchange problem can be resolved and that a foundry will be turning out tractor and implement parts in Turkey within two to three years.

If necessary, the American government may be asked to lend a hand, because of this nation's interest in strengthening Turkey as an ally of the west.

Huff said the tractors, all the same diesel model, sell in Turkey for \$4,700, the same price as imported tractors. In the United States, the same tractor sells for about \$3,500.

"The demand has been heavy,"

Ceremonies Set Tuesday to Open Crystal Shopping Center

Figure 6. 'Executives Report Moline Plant in Turkey Turns Out 700 Tractors', *Minneapolis Sunday Tribune*, August 28, 1955. Manufacturing fewer tractors than expected in one year was still deemed a success. The first tractor factory exhilarated the Turkish public, who seemed to embrace MM. The company received 5000 job applications in less than a year and Minnesota became a well-known state among the Turks.

Tues., Jan. 3, 1956 THE MINNEAPOLIS STAR * 135

'PIONEER STATE'**Minneapolis Leaves Imprint on Turkey, Visitor Here Says**

Minneapolis and Minnesota have become bywords in Turkey. This has happened because of several things, according to Nejdet Erzen of Ankara, who represents several American firms in his country.

Here to consult with Napco Industries, Inc., which is opening a truck manufacturing plant in Turkey, Erzen said the Turks have developed a great love for Minnesota.

"Minneapolis-Moline Co. was the first American company to take advantage of the new foreign encouragement investment law and join the Turkish government and private investors in establishing a tractor plant," he said.

"And just recently Napco, following the same pattern, has started work on a truck plant."

The Turkish people regard Minnesota as a truly pioneer state, one "fully awake to seeing the possibilities in distant lands of establishing manufacturing facilities which will aid such countries as Turkey," Erzen said.

American aid has been of great value to Turkey, especially in its road program, which is connecting the country, he declared.

Turkey, he added, is a very politically strong economic nation "with great possibilities for future business."

The new Turkish Investment law, Erzen said, provided that a foreign firm can take out every year the declared amount of profits as the basis of the company's income tax.

"And you also can take out in foreign currency the capital investment that the company has laid in Turkey in the form of machines, tools, etc.," he said.

The investment law also provides, he said, that in the new company to be formed a certain amount is given for the "know-how" of the American company free of charge.

This know-how may be an addition to the capital of the foreign country free of charge, or it may be in the form of additional percentages of premium to the foreign company that is willing to establish a factory in Turkey.

Once a company is established and manufactures the needs of the country, Erzen said, the Turkish government is very reluctant to give for-



Erzen Henchel

foreign exchange for imports of the same material from foreign countries.

"This protective encouragement will not be in the customs tariff, but will be in the total denial by the government to issue import permits for the material that the foreign company starts to assemble for manufacture of the goods."

One instance of this case, he said, was the problem of Minneapolis-Moline which in 1954 was able to get direct import permits from the Turkish government balance of trade in the Central Bank for an amount of nearly three million dollars.

This same situation, he added, will hold true for Federal Trucks to be manufactured by Napco Industries, or any other company interested in some sort of manufacturing plant in Turkey.

Besides Napco, Erzen as an associate of Industrial Planning Vecdi Diker, and managing director of Tarmal, manufacturers' representative firm, represent other prominent Twin Cities manufacturers, such as Minneapolis-Moline; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.; D. W. Onan & Sons; Wm. Bros Bolders; Baker-Lull.

Figure 7. 'Minneapolis Leaves Imprint on Turkey, Visitor Here Says', *The Minneapolis Star*, January 3, 1956. In the fiscal year of 1956, the progress in business development was more promising. The enhancement in mining operations in Turkey contributed greatly to machinery production. MM's Ankara factory increased its manufacturing capacity for finished products by about 18% and assembled more tractors in 1956.



Minneapolis - Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A. Ş.



Gayelerini ve bugüne kadar kaydetmiş olduğu ilerlemelerini sayın Türk halkına arzeder

Gayesi, Türk çiftçisinin ziraat traktörü ve makinelerini imâl etmek olan Şirketimizin hissesinin ekserisi tamamiyle yerli Türk müesseselerine aittir.

Fabrikamız traktör, ekipman ve yedek parçalarının imâline geçmiş bulunmaktadır.

Mevcud bir dökümhane takviye ve teçhiz edilerek bu sene başından itibaren modern bir şekilde döküm yapmağa başlamış bulunuyor

Memleketimizde çıkarılan ham maddelerden azamlı derecede istifade etmeyi gaye edinmiş bulunup aynı zamanda yurdı dahilindeki sanayicilerle, bu cümleden olmak üzere İstanbul, İzmir, Bursa, Ankara, Balıkesir, Eskişehir, Mihalıççık, Kırıkkale; Mamak; Karabük ve Tavşanlı atel ve tesisleri şimdiden ziraat makinelerinin asli parçalarının bir kısmının teknik nezaretimiz altında imâli için anlaşmalar yapılmıştır.

Bu programımız bir çok vatandaşa yeni iş sahaları kazandırmıştır.

Bu suretle ileri sanayi memleketlerinde olduğu gibi traktör ve ziraat makineleri endüstrisinde yardımcı sanayiın takviyesi ve kurulması yolunda ilk adım atılmıştır.

Hükümetimizin de uygun bulduğu plân mucibince beş sene sonra beher sene içinde 5000 adet traktörü motor ve bölümüm aksam dahil memleket içinde yapmak en esaslı gayemizdir. Bu traktör kıymetinin % 65-70 ine baliğ olmaktadır. Mütebaki kıymetli ise lastik, akümülatör ve elektrik aksamı gibi mamullerdir ki, başka endüstrilerin mevzuuna girer.

Mevcut programımız gereğince 1956 senesinde geçen seneki programın iki misli olarak 2000 adet traktörün yüzde otuz aksaminin imalatına geçmiş bulunuyoruz. Ziraat âletlerinin ise yüzde ellisinin imalatına başlanmıştır. Bu miktar yukarıda arzedilen programın daha fazlasının tahakkuku demektir.

Gayemiz, kıymetli Türk çiftçisinin ihtiyacı olan ziraat traktör ve âletlerini en kısa bir zamanda yurdda imal etmektir. İmalât kapasitemizin artışı müteakib aynı zamanda ihraçta bulunarak memleketi biran evvel döviz teminine çalışmaktadır

Fabrika faaliyetinin yakından görülebilmesi için kapılarımız sayın Türk çiftçisi ve ziyaretçilerine daima açıktır.

Minneapolis - Moline Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A. Ş. P. K. 24 ANKARA

Figure 8. *Cumhuriyet*, January 24, 1956. Besides hiring 200 Turkish workers, MM started to educate Turkish engineers and operational managers on the know-how capabilities of the brand.

Since the Marshall Plan was applied to Turkey in 1948 until 1957, 40.000 tractors were put into operation in Turkey. However, the best guess was at most half of them were associated with equipment.⁸⁷ In advancing years, the working half also started to diminish due to the increment in break downs and lack of spare parts. Following the early Turkish scholarship's calculation that one tractor removed ten people from the fields,⁸⁸ these numbers could hardly estimate a top-down rural modernization or mass migration leading to urbanization.

Prime Minister Menderes referred to all of the construction, infrastructure, and mechanization processes as 'true modernization' and 'development'. During one of his public addresses in 1958, he asked why people could not see that their great and progressive country was becoming one of large, prosperous cities with buildings, plazas, roads, and factories.⁸⁹ Menderes proudly bought the very first MM tractor as 'farmer number one'⁹⁰ and heralded rural enhancement through mechanization. His country might have been on a development track with all these initiatives, but the claims of rural enhancement and urbanization with all of their complexities were still questionable (Figures 11 and 12).

⁸⁷Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization," 398-99.

⁸⁸Özbay, *Dünden Bugüne Aile, Kent ve Nüfus*, 221-2.

⁸⁹Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization," 404.

⁹⁰Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi*, 46.

Display Ad 55 -- No Title
 Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current file); Jun 14, 1956;
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers: U.S. Major Dailies
 pg. 17



Where Sulieman the Magnificent ruled

Modern Turks build Tractors

Where once Sulieman the Magnificent led forth conquering armies, modern Turks are hard at work building a progressive and vigorous republic. And, since in Turkey as everywhere, a thriving agriculture is the backbone of economic progress, the Turks of today are taking the lead in introducing modern mechanized farming to the Near East. Minneapolis-Moline is proud to have an important share in the development of Turkey's agricultural resources through the establishment of the first plant for the manufacture of tractors and farm machinery in Turkey.

Organized May 10, 1954, as Minneapolis-Moline Turk Traktor ve Makineleri, A. O., this pioneering

company includes as partners the Minneapolis-Moline Company, the Turkish Agricultural Bank, Turkish government agencies, and private Turkish investors. Production got under way March 4, 1955, as the first MM tractor manufactured in Turkey rolled off the assembly line.

Establishment of Minneapolis-Moline Turk Traktor ve Makineleri, A. O. marks another important milestone in MM's 131-year tradition of service to the world's agriculture. It is this tradition, and the equally important one of consistent idea leadership in the farm machinery field that has made MM tractors, power units and machines symbolic of dependability and trust the world over.



MINNEAPOLIS-MOLINE

MINNEAPOLIS 1, MINNESOTA *MM is on the March!*

MM builds a complete line of tractors and machinery for the world's farms . . . tractors and power units for world industry.

Figure 10. Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1956.

this argument by stating that urbanization in Turkey in the 1950s can be defined as 'urbanization without industrialization', differing from the Western experience. Unlike the developed Western countries, Turkish cities lacked industrial sites to employ displaced peasants; naturally, applying Americanized modernization through structural transformation and technological developments in agriculture did not result in a reduction of the rural population or the formation of an urbanized society.⁹² İlhan Tekeli also specifically focuses on rural-to-urban migration and explains the process

⁹²Erman, "Urbanization and Urbanism," 293-94.

**ÇİFTÇİYE
ÖĞÜT :
TRAKTÖR
ALACAKSANIZ**

T MINNEAPOLIS – MOLINE
TÜRK TRAKTÖR'ünü alınız.
— Başınız rahat olur...

- Türk Traktör fabrikası öz malımızdır.
- Kasnaklı Traktörler, Pulluk, Diskaro vesair ekipmanlar
- Bol yedek parça
- Daimi servis ve yerinde bakım
- Her yerde acentelik
- Sağlamlık ve garanti

Bütün bu vasıfları ile Türk Traktör fabrikası daima Çiftçimizin hizmetindedir.



TURK TRAKTOR
MAMULATI
SP-3 MODELİ
MOTOPOMP

Minneapolis Moline TÜRK TRAKTÖR ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş. PK. 24 Ankara, Türkiye

İL. 7760/33

Figure 11. 'An Advice for Peasants: Buy Tractor', Cumhuriyet, August 16, 1961.

as an experience of the initial stages of demographic transition, with Turkey having begun industrialization later compared to global economic trajectories. Tekeli details important factors in this transition, such as changing business management schemes in agriculture, the adaptation of the traditional family structure to those changes, and the attractions of urbanizing and developing cities; he also refers to tractorization as one of the reasons for the transition, but not the main reason.⁹³ Along these lines, Sinan Yıldırım criticizes the earliest urbanization literature for grounding a direct and simplistic relationship among rural-to-urban migration, agricultural mechanization, and Cold War modernization for decades and disregarding the complexities. Yıldırım claims that this false portrayal was grounded in the knowledge production trends of the

⁹³Tekeli, *Göç ve Ötesi*.



Figure 12. The very first tractor. Metin Özdemir, *Türk Traktör Tarihi*, p.48.

1950s and 1960s, which positioned peasants as research objects and important subjects of modernization and development, with foreign scholars influencing Turkish scholars in interpretations of modernization as development.⁹⁴

Neither importing limited numbers of tractors through the Marshall Plan nor establishing a tractor factory achieved rural enhancement. In the late 1950s, most of the peasantry continued to work in the fields with their bare hands, using oxen and wooden plows, because tractor ownership remained limited among privileged landowners. The short-term results of the establishment of the tractor factory were considered within the context of changes in modernization as development; however, they did not achieve drastic shifts in the modernization of peasantry⁹⁵ or creating an urbanizing society. The tractor factory shared the fate of AFF and the aircraft engine factory as a paradigmatically dysfunctional part of the modernization of a new capital city (Figures 13).

Conclusion

Turkey's experience of Western development initiatives clearly differed from the experiences of developed states in terms of 'modernization'. The rich literature on architecture and urbanism

⁹⁴Yıldırım, "Developmentalism and Rural Sociology," 91–92. From the perspective of peasants' labor history, however, Yıldırım refines the data and suggests that investment in tractors was not the major reason for rural-to-urban migration, Yıldırım, *Politics and the Peasantry in Post-War Turkey*, 85–6.

⁹⁵Tören, "Yeniden Yapılanan Dünya Ekonomisinde Marshall Planı ve Türkiye Uygulaması," 14.



Figure 13. Altındağ squatter housing settlement before the 1980s. Source: Altındağ Belediyesi, *Altındağ'94*. 1994, p. 70.

offers detailed reviews of the Early Cold War period through architectural and urban projects. In this context, the history of planning and the establishment of a tractor factory, *Türk Traktör*, uniquely stand at a critical scholarly intersection, reflecting the dynamics of the period that set up modernization as development.

Therefore, this paper has carefully unpacked how US and Turkish politics represented tractors as a departure point for modernization as economic development and commonwealth in the Early Cold War period. Tractors became some of the most popular and iconic symbols of ‘Americanization’ and ‘modernization’ in Turkish scholarship and also in Turkish cinema and fiction, largely as a critique of social injustice and unlivable urban conditions.⁹⁶

On the economic spectrum, Turkey advanced toward being a capitalist country, where anti-Soviet policies dominated the public discourse and Americans shaped important governmental decisions in terms of modernization through various tools including agricultural enhancement and privatization.⁹⁷ In rural areas, the mechanization of agriculture was accelerated by tractors imported from the US as a part of the Marshall Plan.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the cultural symbols of these decision-making processes also paved the way for large-scale changes such as the building of dams and highways for better irrigation and the transportation of surplus agricultural products to foreign markets. Tractors themselves and the establishment of a facility manufacturing tractors, as one of the macroeconomic projects of the Marshall Plan, have allowed this paper to revisit the

⁹⁶Bengi and Zat, “Gavur Öküzü,” 128–33; Kemal, *Hüyükteki Nar Ağacı*.

⁹⁷Örnek and Üngör, *Turkey in the Cold War*, 3.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 6.

period's paradigm of modernization as development and consider how modernization was predominantly introduced as economic development under the leadership of American experts in both the US and Turkey.

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