Original Article

EJIR

European Journal of
International Relations
1–23

DOI: 10.1177/13540661221131432
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
SAGE

Terrorism as a conceptual site for power struggles: problematization of terrorism in Turkey in the 1970s

Tuncer Beyribey
Independent Researcher, Turkey

Abstract

In critical terrorism analysis, (counter-)terrorism is thought to be a discursive formation of power/knowledge comprised of some security experts from governments, the media, and academics. However, this one-sided articulation ignores the struggles in the concept of terrorism between historical narratives and counter-narratives, and it may be understood as a conceptual site where different political actors interpret it universally to strengthen or resist preexisting power relations. This article proposes that the problematization of terrorism can be studied by evaluating opposing narratives produced by political actors aiming to assert their power positions, drawing on Foucault's analysis of problematization. From this theoretical perspective, this article examines how terrorism was problematized in relation to political violence in Turkey between 1971 and 1977, and how political actors used the concept of terrorism as a site for power struggle to gain dominant positions or weaken others, insofar as discrete ideological attitudes (communism and neo-fascism/racism, respectively) were abnormalized by universalizing them as a part of "international" terrorism. In this sense, the article contends that examining terrorism as a "universalized" site of power struggle can improve the analytical framework of critical terrorism studies by integrating the possibility of counter-narratives and, as a result, contradictions in the terrorism discourse.

Keywords

Critical terrorism studies, problematization, Turkey, 1970s, political violence

Corresponding author:
Tuncer Beyribey, Independent Researcher, Ordu Cad. 136/20 Bandırma/Balıkesir, 10200, Turkey.
Email: t.beyribey@hotmail.com

Introduction

In the critical analyses, the discourse of terrorism is highly related to power. Terrorism is regarded as a discursive formation of power/knowledge in this approach, and counterterrorism practices are formed by this discourse, resulting in the construction of the necessary instruments to combat it (Ditrych, 2014; Erlenbusch-Anderson, 2018; Jackson, 2005; Jarvis, 2009; McQuade, 2021; Martini, 2016; Meier, 2020; Puar and Rai, 2002; Raphael, 2009; Stampnitzky, 2013; Toros, 2012). This line of reasoning is essential for seeing terrorism as a contestable and contingent reality that is effective in managing a populace by rationalizing certain restrictive technologies. Even though these analyses contribute significantly to our understanding of how dominant narratives are reproduced, their heavy focus on the Western understandings of terrorism overlooks how the concept of terrorism has become a site of contestation among political actors by the way of international entanglements of national narratives of terrorism. The concept of terrorism, according to this article, necessitates an examination of the "universalized" impacts of various sources of power attempting to strengthen or resist preexisting power relations. Terrorism can be viewed in this light as a conceptual site for power struggles in which opposing narratives and counter-narratives collide. For this purpose, this article aims to understand how political actors in Turkey in the 1970s deployed the concept of terrorism in their power struggle by "universalizing" their particularistic claims. In other words, by referencing the terrorism narratives that were accepted as "universal" realities, it analyzes how the domestic power struggle was reflected on the global stage.

Examining the global interconnections of national narratives for the aim of mobilizing in power struggles could be started by considering the concept of problematization. Problematization is the process of describing a phenomenon or subjective experience as a problem that needs to be addressed. To put it another way, problematization is the process of determining how a particular phenomenon becomes an object of power/knowledge (Deacon, 2000; Foucault, 1988, 1990). Problems are historically constituted and contingent discursive formations. The problematization of terrorism, according to this article, can be studied in the context of power struggles. By "universalizing" individual narratives in the constitution of a problem, this kind of analysis allows us to comprehend how political actors engage in conflict and negotiate among themselves. According to this, political actors can rewrite narratives of terrorism to offset their political positions by problematizing specific types of violent actions for the tactical necessities to continue their power struggles. In this article, it will be analyzed how political actors in Turkey employed "universalized" terrorism narratives to maintain or challenge their dominant positions in the 1970s.

Two objectives were examined for this purpose: first, how terrorism was constituted as a problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the rise and suppression of the Left, resulting in the 1971 Military Memorandum, which became a reference point for different political actors to interpret political violence in Turkey; second, how the concept of terrorism can be studied as a site for a power struggle between different political actors to "universalize" their socio-political narratives in order to problematize political violence by analyzing parliamentary speeches from the center-left Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Turkish Right, which includes the center-right Justice Party (JP), the

neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party (NAP), the Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP), the Kemalist-rightist Republican Reliance Party (RRP), and the conservative Democratic Party (DP). All parliamentary speeches are gathered from the 15th Parliament, which ran from 1973 to 1977, following Operation Sledgehammer, a campaign against the "extreme" Left that began after the 1971 Military Memorandum and finished at the end of the 14th Parliament.

Problematization and power struggles

The concept of terrorism is widely documented in critical terrorism analyses as the result of the constitution of a specific sort of political violence as such by powerful political actors and bureaucratic elites (Jackson, 2005; Jarvis, 2009; Raphael, 2009). The concept of terrorism, from this perspective, is a manifestation of power. Indeed, according to this line of reasoning, representatives of the government, security professionals, and the media are responsible for a large portion of the terrorism discourse. As suggested by Campos (2007), "framing terrorism as a threat to national security produces and legitimizes power relations that act as a field of statecraft in which security becomes a commodity within the control of the state" (p. 2). Critical terrorism analyses have focused on the "public narratives" that establish "a new and unquestioned reality in which the application of state violence appears normal and reasonable" (Jackson, 2005: 1). In this regard, it is critical to comprehend how terrorism is framed as a type of political violence that necessitates a swift and forceful reaction from the state.

It should be accepted that these security professionals are crucial to understand the prevalence of a specific narrative on terrorism as they have the institutional, financial, political, and even normative sources of control over population (Meier, 2020). In this aspect, terrorism is a cogent discursive formation, given that an exceptionally specific type of political violence incited new reactions and raised discussion on how to analyze and resolve this new kind of problem. However, its reality is still based on all the discursive practices which constitute it as a question of national security (Jackson, 2005; Norris et al., 2003). In this regard, terrorism has become a pretext for governments to control their populations and lay claim to the truth that imagines a society where a robust distinction can be made between normal and the anti-societal behaviors (Campos, 2007; Jackson, 2005). The fight against terrorism is based on a normality held by the majority of a society, and its defense may require certain measures beyond the normal operation of security devices. For this reason, critical studies on terrorism have weighed its attention in dominant narratives that justify the normative ordinance of the Western world like the War on Terror (Jackson, 2005; Jarvis, 2009; Puar and Rai, 2002; Raphael, 2009).

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the emphasis on dominant discourses and public narratives overlooks the possibilities of resistance and counter-narratives under the concept of terrorism (Erlenbusch-Anderson, 2018, 2022). Power, in the Foucauldian sense, is not unidirectional or coercive, but rather relational. This means that power is not over individuals but intersects with them; it is not imposed but exercised. Because of these aspects of power, resistance is always possible. It is because "where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault, 1990: 95). This means that there must be

multiple knots of resistance to power to exist, since "resistance does not simply undermine discourses, but it also supports or 'handles' power relations, thus in different ways it interacts and co-exists with, and supports power" (Lilja, 2018: 426). In this perspective, political power is not a question of sovereignty, contract, or monopoly of violence, but it needs to be analyzed "in terms of unending and shifting struggle, a movement that makes some dominant over others" (Oksala, 2011: 160).

Power struggles over conceptualizations are especially important in problematizing a phenomenon. Foucault (1988: 257) defines problematization as "the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)." The defining concepts vis-à-vis a problem, therefore, result from problematization. As Bonditti (2017; *emphasis in original*) argues, "a concept emerges of *necessity* in a field of knowledge and practice faced with *a practical problem*" (p. 158). Thus, the analysis of a problematization concerns the way a phenomenon becomes the subject of power/knowledge by constituting it as a problem. In this context, problematization is about "how and why, at specific times and under particular circumstances, certain phenomena are questioned, analyzed, classified, and regulated, while others are not" (Deacon, 2000: 127). Problematizations constitute certain things or experiences as problematic and acclimate us to the possibilities of behaviors and attitudes that are inscribed as normal and real (Bevir, 1999; Koopman, 2013).

Methods generated in response to a problem can be analyzed as the result of problematization, which expresses them as "necessary components of our reality" (Dean, 1994: 33). Problematization reifies things and "as the very shaping of problems, it is an activity that dictates how we might understand them and thus begin to respond to them" (Gilson, 2014: 77). Terrorism, for example, has become a reality when a certain sort of political violence is portrayed as a problem that requires technical solutions. To denaturalize the "objective" conditions of reality, a genealogical approach to problematizations is needed (Koopman, 2013). In this vein, for Foucault (2001) the problematization can be analyzed as the "history of thought," that is

> . . . the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which were familiar and "silent," out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions. The history of thought, understood in this way, is the history of the way people begin to take care of something, of the way they become anxious about this or that—for example, about madness, about crime, about sex, about themselves, or about truth. (p. 74)

It can be assumed, based on this theoretical perspective, that terrorism was transformed into an issue rather than appearing as a problem in and of itself (Bonditti, 2017). Once terrorism has become a problem for national security, "power is used as a practice that constitutes, legitimizes, produces and re-produces a host of knowledges and practices to ensure that certain modes of responses to terrorism are pre-conditioned and employed" (Campos, 2007: 3). On the contrary, the concept is always vulnerable to opposition. As Foucault (1990) suggests, "discourse transmits and produces power; it

reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (p. 101). Like Norris et al. (2003) underline, "since labelling certain actions or actors as 'terrorist' carries strong normative overtones, the social construction of reality cannot avoid being an intensely political contest" (p. 6). As a result, terrorism discourse functions as both a justifying element of authority and a destabilizing factor in the name of resistance.

Indeed, as demonstrated by the genealogical studies of terrorism, the concept of terrorism has always been susceptible to competing narratives. Whereas Ditrych (2014) discusses how the concept of terrorism became a site for struggle between the "First World" and the "Third World" to capture "a hegemonic understanding of what legitimate violence is, and what constitutes a just political order" (p. 56), Martini (2020) examines how governments within the UN Security Council utilize the concept of terrorism to either legitimize or delegitimize the violence employed by both the Syrian government and the armed groups. Moreover, Erlenbusch-Anderson (2018) analyzes how the concept of terrorism was mobilized by the French authorities to continue colonial war and how it was resisted by the anti-colonial revolutionaries to imply the state violence in the French Algeria. For this reason, the discourse of terrorism is always "tactically reversible," in the sense that

> If different subjects are to be able to speak, to occupy different tactical positions, and if they are to be able to find themselves in mutually adversarial positions, there has to be a tight field, there has to be a very tightly woven network to regularize historical knowledge. As the field of knowledge becomes more regular, it becomes increasingly possible for the subjects who speak within it to be divided along strict lines of confrontation, and it becomes increasingly possible to make the contending discourses function as different tactical units within overall strategies (which are not simply a matter of discourse and truth, but also of power, status, and economic interests). (Foucault, 2003: 208)

Since terrorism has historically meant governmental violence or revolutionary violence, it is crucial to consider how open the concept of terrorism is to new interpretations, and thus power struggles (Blain, 2007). For example, Erlenbusch-Anderson (2022) discusses that naming White supremacist violence as terrorism has been a tactical tool for the abolitionists in the power struggles in the history of the United States. However, as the author shows, this narrative of terrorism "yields a notion of terrorism as a technology of power that both threatens and enforces the foundational values of the United States," even though it was used to convey an all-encompassing definition of terrorism as a "natural" category (Erlenbusch-Anderson, 2022: 293). Because of this reason, Erlenbusch-Anderson (2022) proposes to analyze "terrorism as a space of contestation and ambiguity in which different, conflicting, and often incompatible meanings and interpretations coexist" (p. 277). This analysis allows to understand the dynamics of power among the different political actors to be dominant in the narration of terrorism.

What is more, power struggles over concepts imply "universality." This is not to say that universal narratives exist outside of historical and contextual specificity. Rather, it means that political actors draw on "universal" claims that "has been declared as such by those whose right to speak in the name of the universal is often taken for granted" (Li,

2020: 3). In order to advance their socio-political normativities, political actors therefore engage with "universal" statements that are purported to be "ahistorical" and "context-free." This entails political players "naturalizing" their claims or viewpoints by presenting them as the sole legitimate ones. In other words, "universality is a dynamic process of universalizability rather than a static property theorized under universalism" (Koopman, 2013: 232). This suggests that "universality" is contingent in the sense that it is never fully realized, but serves as a normative ideal in order to justify their domestic claims made by political actors in their power struggles (Bevir, 1999; Neal, 2004). In doing so, political actors engage in "universal" claims to redefine what takes place in the context of domestic power struggles, thus reproducing them.

Political actors extrapolate their domestic power struggles to the global stage, and universality serves as a feedback loop to promote their normative subjectivities. As will be discussed in more detail, the concept of terrorism was used by the Turkish Right to imagine their power struggle as one between communist subversives and nationalist patriots occurring on a global scale, while the RPP used it to describe the power struggle between reactionaries and progressives occurring everywhere in the world. In this manner, their conception of a power struggle came to be "universalized" as the sole "real" account of what transpired in the world at the time. In short, "the effect of these modern political discourses is to erase a contested historicity of partisan struggles and replace it with a story of ideal origins and universalistic normative aspirations" (Neal, 2008: 59). In this context, the term "universalization" in relation to terrorism refers to the normative aspirations of those who use the term terrorism to reflect "universally accepted" claims in order to mobilize the concept in their domestic power struggles that they perceive to be a part of larger global conflicts (Ditrych, 2014; Erlenbusch-Anderson, 2018; McQuade, 2021).

Furthermore, a struggle among political actors over the concept of terrorism does not imply that one of them will succeed in eliminating the others. Instead, those meanings collide and combine simultaneously. As Bigo (2017) discusses, "what is central is that the struggles inside and between fields of power and politics do not always polarize, they escape, stretch, disjunct, diffract and intermingle on overlapping subjects" (p. 31). In this perspective, the problematization of terrorism was always fluid: there were narratives and counter-narratives about how terrorism can be defined universally and were always in juxtaposition (Ditrych, 2014; Erlenbusch-Anderson, 2018). This involves evaluating terrorism as part of a transformational process in which various "universal" lines are recast into everyday politics to define the legitimate boundaries of subjectivity (Bigo, 2017; Bonditti, 2017).

The problematization of political violence and the emergence of radical politics, particularly in the 1970s, gave rise to the concept of terrorism (Ditrych, 2014; Erlenbusch-Anderson, 2018; Stampnitzky, 2013).[1] Different types of acts, such as killings, bombings, hijackings, bank robberies, and assassinations, were grouped together under the umbrella term of terrorism to distinguish their meanings for specific purposes, such as political objectives, by linking the domestic and international. Fixing the terrorism problem between the internal and external dilutes the threat, because terrorism's global nature reflects numerous subjective positions such as traitors, puppets, or conspirators (Bigo, 2000, 2001). In this context, when radical politics spread over national boundaries in the 1970s, "international terrorism" was problematized. As a result, terrorism should be

viewed as a conceptual site for power struggles during "the Cold War," as "a disciplinary strategy that was global in scope but national in design" (Campbell, 2000: 227). This means that various political actors defined it on a global scale yet incorporated it into their power struggles in order to evaluate its globality for domestic purposes. In the following parts, how political violence in Turkey was problematized as terrorism and how different political actors used the concept of terrorism to make "universal" claims in order to redefine the domestic power struggle in the context of global politics will be discussed.

Problematization of political violence in Turkey

The Turkish case can be a useful example of how the concept of terrorism can be analyzed as a site for power struggles among various political actors seeking to consolidate or oppose existing relations of power. The reason for this is because Turkey was a polarized country in the 1970s. The political system had become severely fractious, resulting in highly unstable and turbulent governments, as well as the growth of political violence. Furthermore, the prospect of another military intervention in politics aggravated the situation. In addition, the governments' instability was exacerbated by the rapid deterioration of economic conditions (Gunter, 1989; Sayarı, 1978). In this political context, the Turkish Right and the RPP have been pitted against one other, accusing each other of poor administration. The concept of terrorism became a site for these actors to abnormalize the opponent for the political violence that was taking place in this setting.

Turkey became a bastion in the fight against international communism in the 1970s. Turkey was conceived as a critical outpost to oppose communism as a NATO member and a neighbor of the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern countries (Örnek, 2015). As a result, the state structure was integrated into the Western alliance. This allowed Turkish political elites to rationalize integration by claiming that it was necessary to preserve both the motherland and the Western alliance from communist attack (Öztan and Özekmekçi, 2014). Growing anti-communist emotions infiltrated the Turkish Right and security architecture, especially in the military, as Örnek (2015) demonstrates, resulting in "anti-communist hysteria" (p. 63).

During the 1970s, terrorism emerged as a concern in Turkey as a result of the collision and convergence of numerous "universalized" narratives. In the 1970s, the emergence of the leftist youth movement and the radicalization of everyday politics resulted in violent clashes between different segments of Turkish society. Political actors who struggled for control of state power problematized these incidents to legitimize their positions of power or to exclude others. In other words, as terrorism was portrayed as the enemy of a society's normalcy, the normative existence of subjectivity was created vis-à-vis terrorist others. However, political actors have always struggled to give meaning to normalcy, and the normal and abnormal have become universalized. To put it another way, the question of normalcy was always defined in terms of global struggles that were projected upon Turkey (Örnek and Üngör, 2013). This means that the concept of terrorism was "global in scope but national in design" when it came to the question of normalcy. This requires a special attention on the problematization of the rise of the Left in Turkey within the context of political violence, which is what this section seeks to do.

The rise of the Left in the 1960s

The problematization of terrorism in Turkey correlates with international and national dynamics that have affected the power struggle between various political actors. On the international level, the rise of leftist youth movements and the bipolarity of the Cold War problematized political violence in the West as the final conflict between "communist radicalism" and "the free world," resulting in the narrative of terrorism's internationalization (Martini, 2016). Turkey, like the rest of the world, was entering the 1970s at a time when "class warfare was intensifying, and practically all socioeconomic groups realized that Turkey was not an organic collectivity" (Turan, 2013: 5). These anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-American organizations grew in power as their dynamism coincided with the workers' movement (Alper, 2014; Criss, 2002). These groups "have the goal of releasing individuals from subjection (what ties one to oneself) and from submissive forms of subjectivities (hegemonic capitalist–consumerist subjectivity)" (Genosko, 2009: 263). Two significant factors in this environment contributed to the problematization of terrorism: the emergence of the Left in Turkey and the suppression of leftist movements following the 1971 Military Memorandum. As it will be discussed in detail, these two events served as turning points, particularly for the Turkish Right, in terms of providing context for understanding the political violence that had occurred in Turkey as terrorism. They offered the Turkish Right the fundamental principles for demonizing leftist movements and defending all forms of state repression.

There are three major developments that are critical at that time. The first is the rise of the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*—WPT), which was founded in 1961. In Turkey, there was essentially no socialism experience, and there was no major socialist movement that could have influenced Turkish politics and society. Furthermore, Turkey's "anti-communist hysteria" was so strong that nearly all major political parties and bureaucratic elites distanced themselves from it in order to avoid being labeled as communists (Örnek, 2015: 63). Nonetheless, Turkey's comparatively liberal 1961 Constitution allowed for the formation of a socialist party with the goal of advancing the socialist program through democratic means. In this context, the WPT won 14 seats in the parliament in the 1965 General Elections, out of 450 total and became a strong parliamentary oppositional group under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar. As a result, the socialist Left became more visible in the political arena, which the Turkish Right viewed as a move toward communism and secession in Turkey (Ahmad, 1993).[2]

The second key change was the rise of "radical" leftist youth movements. Leftist youth organizations were mostly organized in major universities as the local profile of the 1968 radical politics. These movements, which arose from the WPT's youth organization but lost faith in democratic processes, organized several gatherings and protests during the end of the 1960s (Alper, 2010; Sayarı, 2010). The protests against the US Sixth Fleet's visit were the most notable. Leftist student organizations believed that the only way to combat American imperialism was to question them on every occasion, beginning in 1967 and continuing until 1969. Protesters splashed ink on the soldiers, flung stones at the hotels where they stayed, burnt their cars, and even threw them into the sea (Atılgan, 2017). Youth anti-communist organizations, on the contrary, began to

urge the planning of protests against the leftist groups. In February 1969, the "Bloody Sunday" occurred, when rightist and anti-communist mobs attacked protesting leftist organizations, killing two people and injuring hundreds more. As a result, leftist youth organizations became even less interested in democratic processes, and their conviction in armed struggle grew (Bozarslan, 2020).

The workers' movement was the third significant development. Following the military coup in 1960, the new constitution declared Turkey to be a "social state," granting and protecting new rights to workers to organize, resulting in "new political opportunities for the expansion of the Turkish labor movement" (Mello, 2007: 218). The creation of the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*—CRTU) in 1967 marked the beginning of the radicalization of the workers' movement. The CRTU was founded on the initiative of a group of socialist labor leaders led by Kemal Türkler. At the end of the 1960s, it was successful in organizing meetings and protests, forcing governments and some large corporations to compromise on favor of workers. In this regard, the JP government sought to amend the Labor Law and the Worker Unions Law in order to stifle the CRTU's activities and make it harder for workers to switch unions, and it was voted into law. Because of this, the CRTU organized one of Turkey's largest labor protests in June 1970, which the government addressed with force, resulting in the proclamation of martial law. However, it demonstrated that the leftist awakening as a protest cycle, which took place at the intellectual level in the WPT and at the university youth level in leftist organizations, was popularized and gained a foothold among the Turkish population, undermining the incumbent JP's political power (Alper, 2010).

The Turkish Right saw this interplay between party politics, youth movements, and labor unions as the greatest threat to Turkey in the foreseeable future. On one hand, it was thought that radicalization in universities and labor unions had begun to dominate daily political debates in the streets. On the other hand, with the emergence of the WPT, party politics became more "leftist," and the RPP, led by Bülent Ecevit, was obligated to adapt its agenda with more leftist slogans and programs (Ahmad, 1993; Zürcher, 2017). This reflection of the "growth of the left" among the Turkish Right heightened "anti-communist hysteria" by "mystifying the enemy," and it was said that the Turkish state's and society's integrity and survival were in jeopardy (Özman and Yazıcı Yakın, 2012). As a result of the problematization of radical leftist groups in the West, such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Red Army Faction in West Germany, and increasing actions by the Palestinian Liberation Organization showing solidarity with those leftist groups, international terrorism became the focus of Western states' attention in the context of communist internationalism (Ditrych, 2014), the Turkish Right began to argue that Turkey was becoming a center point for international communism, citing these as instances of the massive threat (Gümrükçü, 2022).

In this radical environment, anti-communist rightist organizations such as the Association of Struggle Against Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*) and the National Turkish Students Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) began campaigns against leftist youth organizations, including violence, as seen on Bloody Sunday. In addition, the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları* or Grey Wolves), the youth organization of neo-fascist NAP, was founded in 1968 and quickly initiated violent operations against leftist

organizations (Jacoby, 2010).[3] Despite the fact that it was promoted as a place where Turkish youth could learn about national values, "their uniformed marches and demonstrations and their violent clashes with leftist groups attracted much interest, particularly in the press antagonistic to the Nationalist Action Party, which did not fail to draw comparisons with fascist and Nazi youth groups" (Landau, 1982: 594). It was claimed that communist gangs were carrying out heinous acts in order to turn Turkey into a Soviet Union satellite state. As a result, "this commitment to the state and the will to serve it, in conjunction with their ideology glorifying violence, meant 'protecting' the state from the anticipated communist threat" (Gümrükçü, 2021). Thus, rightist gangs, particularly the Grey Wolves, mobilized violence for a "life or death war" in the name of "defending the homeland" against "puppets of communist terror" (Bozarslan, 2009: 377; see also Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992; Gourisse, 2022).

1971 Turkish military memorandum and suppression of the Left

The military became a battleground for various political ideologies as a result of these political events. Some high-ranking generals, led by General Faruk Gürler, Commander of the Land Forces, and General Muhsin Batur, Commander of the Air Forces, were particularly dissatisfied with the Demirel government and the violent events and huge protests that had rendered Turkey ungoverned. These more leftist-Kemalist military officers were organizing a coup, but it was thwarted when Chief of the General Staff General Memduh Tağmaç dissuaded these two high-ranking officers from participating in the coup. On 12 March 1971, the military issued a memorandum beneath the chain of command. "The Republic of Turkey's future is under tremendous peril," according to the memorandum, "since the Turkish Parliament's attitudes, beliefs, and acts have directed the country into chaos, fratricidal strife, and social and economic turmoil." Following that, the military was ordered to take control of the country unless the Demirel administration resigned, and a new nonpartisan government was created. The Memorandum was ostensibly written with four goals in mind: "to check activities against the secular Republic; to put an end to ideological and bloody incidents; to stop divisive activities in the eastern provinces, and to afford a favorable position for possible action in Cyprus" (Ahmad, 1977: 293).

The Demirel government resigned after the Memorandum, and a right-wing technocratic government led by Nihat Erim was formed in its place. The Parliament, on the contrary, remained unchanged, and the military demanded that the Erim government implement certain political reforms. Following it, the Erim government launched Operation Sledgehammer, a campaign against numerous leftist organizations. The WPT and the CRTU were closed, their members were brought into arrest and martial law was imposed in 11 provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara. On the contrary, a number of communist youth leaders were apprehended shortly after the memorandum in order to "secure the streets from gangs." As a result, political violence intensified, resulting in events like the shooting death of Ephraim Elrom, an Israeli consul general, and the shootout between police and leftist militants in Kizildere. Following it, the majority of the youth groups that had been outfitted with weapons to launch an uprising against the government were annihilated.

The military's main argument was that the liberties granted by the 1961 Constitution were "too broad" for Turkish society (Öztan and Özekmekçi, 2014). The vast rights guaranteed by the Constitution were a major factor in the emergence of the Left in the 1960s. As previously mentioned, these liberties enabled the formation of socialist groups such as the CRTU and the WPT, and youth movements found a basis to broaden their sympathizers by allowing them to hold meetings and protests at universities. These rights, on the contrary, exposed the socio-economic polarization in Turkish society as a result of massive migration surges from rural to urban regions and the over-population of cities in the 1960s, which resulted in the emergence of a new working class that was "the hope of the leftists, and *gecekondu* [squatter] settlements became the sites of radical politics" (Erdem, 2001: 986). The 1971 Memorandum sought to limit the power of leftist labor and youth groups while strengthening right-wing parties and wealthy corporations in this regard. As Keyder (1987) writes, "as the military intervention came to an end, the economic domination of large industrial capital was consolidated" (p. 53).[4] The 1971 Memorandum's class perspective is crucial in the problematization of terrorism in Turkey, because the RPP's main focus was on the socio-economic dimension of terrorism, which was defined as a tool used by domestic collaborators of multinational corporations and imperialist states to coerce progressives, that is, the working class, leftist youth, and intellectuals.

The class viewpoint of the 1971 Memorandum, on the contrary, occupied a key position among rightist groups. As Öztan and Özekmekçi (2014) point out, some of the military's basic arguments "exactly overlapped with the general comments of Turkish Right, which evaluated freedom of speech and organization as an issue threatening the national existence" (p. 57). Right-wing parties were alarmed by the mobilization and popularization of "radical" leftist ideas, which were regarded as a divisive ideological campaign against organic society in the corporatist sense (Yeğen, 2007). Some domestic situations were abused by "communist terror" by portraying them as socio-economic concerns. Terrorism was defined as the domestic manifestation of international communism. Anti-communism was equated with counterterrorism, with the goal of disciplining Turkish society by radicalizing the fight against it. As a result, between 1971 and 1973, activities against leftist organizations were portrayed as a struggle against international terrorism.

The Prime Ministry produced an official document titled *The Truths in Turkey and Terrorism* in 1973, which is the first official document in Turkey to include the term terrorism in its title. Turkey was under attack from international communism, according to the text, and Operation Sledgehammer was a response to it. Indeed, "Turkey has been fighting communist attacks since the 1920s," and "their goal was to build a state with proletarian dictatorship and authoritarian communist party control," according to the argument (Prime Ministry, 1973: 16). Domestic leftist movements were portrayed as being a part of an international communist conspiracy in this regard. They were allegedly educated, given logistical support, and given weaponry by several countries such as the USSR, Palestine, and Syria and terrorist organizations, most notably the Palestine Liberation Organization in order to assist communist revolution in Turkey (Prime Ministry, 1973: 116–120). They were said to be "formed at universities, which became the arsenal of such groups" (Prime Ministry, 1973: 45), and infiltrated among Turkish youth, "the vast majority of whom were Kemalist," to lead them away from their noble

path. They employed "communist demagogy" in the sense that "they were talking about capitalist organizations' repression to disseminate the idea that there was a class dominance in Turkey" (Prime Ministry, 1973: 16). They employed these "divisive and subversive operations" to pave the way for a communist revolution, according to this viewpoint (Prime Ministry, 1973: 18). There was a normative difference between leftist and rightist violence. As a consequence, it was determined that the street conflicts were the product of communist organizations' actions. The latter was labeled "reactionary" (Prime Ministry, 1973: 51), while the former was just labeled "terrorist." For the Turkish Right, this was significant since it established a reference point in the terrorism narrative, which was recognized by the state elites. In this light, referring to terrorism as a divisive instrument of international communism was legitimate in the struggle against leftist movements. The motivation for the struggle against terrorism was thus linked to the problematization of terrorism in the West in the 1970s.

Universal lines of terrorism narratives

As Ditrych (2014) explains, there were two main narratives on terrorism, which were struggling for dominant position, namely the First World narrative and the Third World narrative. While the former associated terrorism with international communism, which was thought to be employing some radical leftist organization to overthrow the "democratic" regimes of the "free world," the latter describes terrorism as "as a system of capitalist exploitation and imperialism, or a faceless machine of the state terrorism apparatus practiced by particular alien powers against oppressed peoples." As a result, "the discourse of terrorism was now a true power to be seized" (Ditrych, 2014: 56). When terrorism became a political concern in the international arena, it was problematized in the context of a power struggle among diverse political actors in Turkey. Terrorism was a conceptual site where numerous narratives intersected and merged on a domestic and international scale.

Political actors struggled to justify their own political agendas and actions, as well as to abnormalize the ideological and political views of others. As a result, those political actors justified their narratives by using definitions and explanations that were widely available in the international community. To put it another way, domestic ideas were made to appear international in order to justify them. This occurred during Turkey's political and socioeconomic crisis, and terrorism was the response or all-encompassing term to characterize what the crisis was, when it occurred, and what types of answers should have been supplied by reflecting the circumstance into "universal" narratives.

The parliament was not abolished by the 1971 Military Memorandum, therefore it continued on its normal timetable. Thus, elections had to be held in 1973. Surprisingly, the RPP came out on top in the elections. This meant that the RPP's "moderate" Left took a huge step forward, and the 1971 Memorandum and Operation Sledgehammer had no effect on weakening the Left. The election outcome, however, did not provide the RPP a majority in parliament, forcing it to create a coalition government. As a result, the RPP unexpectedly reached an agreement with the NSP. During this time, there was also an increase in polarization among political actors, particularly between the Turkish Right and the RPP.

Terrorism from international communism

There were two major turning points in the Turkish Right's definition of terrorism. The rise of the Marxist youth movement in 1968 was the first. This was regarded as a domestic continuation of the West's 1968 youth movements. To put it another way, these youth organizations were USSR conspirators. For example, one DP legislator said that these youth protests began as "innocent student movements" but quickly evolved into unlawful acts such as "student strikes, occupations, and subsequently beating of lecturers and murders of students, eventually damaging public property" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1974a: 449). These youth movements attempted to create an environment conducive to the emergence of a revolutionary scenario. They are those who believe in "ideologies that challenge societal order, national ethics, and national survival" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1974a: 417). This classified all leftist youth movements as international terrorism conspirators.

The 1971 Military Memorandum was the second watershed moment. As previously stated, activities by communist organizations were labeled as terrorist. They were accused of carrying out terrorist acts in order to facilitate a communist revolution. In this regard, the Turkish Right contended that communist provocations, as seen during Operation Sledgehammer, were the main cause of street conflicts. This meant that the only option to combat terrorism was to use the police force to crush any "radical" communist activities and to prevent all ideological expressions from spreading throughout Turkish society. During Operation Sledgehammer, the Turkish government's harsh attitude on leftist organizations was affirmed by this viewpoint among the Turkish Right. Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister before the Memorandum and the leader of Turkey's largest rightist party, the JP, claimed that "radical" leftist groups viewed Turkey as a "laboratory" and attempted to "incite anarchy inside Turkey," but failed because state security forces "collar those group" resulting in the suppression of the leftist insurgency (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1976b: 273). This view of the leftist uprising labeled them as traitors and enemies of the state—insider outsiders.

The Turkish Right's definition of terrorism was based on the nationalism versus separatism/subversion dichotomy (Beyribey, 2022). Terrorism was seen as separatist, divisive, and subversive operations against the Turkish state and nation. This splits the Turkish populace into two opposing factions. Under the nationalist-conservative social order, Turkey was thought to be an organic and completely functional union (Akgün, 2002; Grigoriadis, 2011; Jacoby, 2010). As a result, the Turkish nation was naturally ordered and unified, and the normative subjectivity of the majority of the nation was presumed to be Turkish-Muslim. A small group of separatists, subversives, and anarchists, on the contrary, employed terrorism to undermine the nation's natural functioning (Gourisse, 2022). In this way, terrorism was a weapon used by the enemies of the Turkish nation and state, according to the Turkish Right.

Within this framework, it is possible to assert that universal lines of terrorism were linked through international communism. International communism, according to this, is the most severe threat to the free world, including Turkey, which has used terrorism as a weapon to destabilize Western countries. Turkey was regarded as one of the front lines in the war against communism, and any "extreme" leftist actions were seen as part of a

global communist conspiracy. Leftist movements were viewed as collaborators, as well as being "dominated by international communism" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1974a: 449), "a fraction of the destitute who are enslaved by others" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 30), "a group of young people who are influenced by factors other than their own country and religion" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 625), and "thugs who are tethered to someone's apron" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1976c: 4).

In the 1970s, communism was blamed for terrorist actions. As a result, nationalist-conservative subjectivity was branded as communism's archenemy. In other words, the views and attitudes based on nationalism and Islamic conservatism were thought to be natural in Turkish society. It was asserted, for example, that Turkish youth were "a nationalist totality outside of a small percentage of those who have been drawn by other ideologies" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 30) and "those who believe in God and their nations" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 132). As a result, it was assumed that "[Turkey] will not submit to terrorists as long as Turkish patriots and those who have shed blood for this holy motherland for ages exist" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 200). As terrorist actions were represented as worldwide, and nationalism was designed to guard against those international plots, there was a split between national and international in this line. The reasons for political violence in Turkey were therefore externalized. All potential reasons that may be referred to in Turkey's own socio-political concerns were regarded as being exploited by external forces in order to destabilize Turkey through Marxist agendas.

This type of broad-brush indictment of the Left included all civil society organizations. In this approach, terrorism in Turkey had two basic methods. There was a terroristic armed conflict on one hand. The armed struggle, on the other hand, was supported by agitation and propaganda. Protests, "false" claims of torture, propagandist publishing, and "divisive" civil society organizations and associations such as the CRTU, the Association of Unity and Solidarity of All Teachers, and the Association of Police Officers were among the "stereotypical methods of international communism" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1974a: 417). Because they were labeled as traitors and conspirators, it was suggested that the only option to fight international communism was for the Turkish Right to build a nationalist government. When the RPP was in power, it was accused of shielding those groups and institutions and of being the main cause of the Turkish state's weakness. For example, a JP legislator accused the RPP of being "the source of anarchy, a home for thugs, and a haven for terrorists" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 117), while another claimed that the RPP was "enthused to safeguard anarchy" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 199). As a result, the Turkish Right's construction of "national front" governments in the 1970s was bolstered by the notion of a wide coalition to counter leftist advancements in the country.

Terrorism from reactionary forces

While the Turkish Right equated terrorism solely with leftist activities, the RPP's concept of terrorism was ambiguous. On one hand, the neo-fascist Grey Wolves were unmistakably blamed for the political violence in Turkey. In this view, the Turkish Right safeguarded the Grey Wolves, who were then unleashed on the progressive parts of

Turkish society in order to keep them under the exploitation of imperialism and its domestic allies. On the other hand, by supporting legislative processes and "moderate" leftist policies, the RPP separated itself from such "extreme" leftist movements. Given that terrorism was regarded a regressive weapon by some ideologies, the RPP's dilemma was overcome. Bülent Ecevit's legislative speech provides the most prominent example:

> Some people are attempting to direct society using Bakunin and Nechaev's 100-year-old methods of terrorism, anarchy, and assassinations, and they are one hundred years behind the society . . . Again, some people aspire to the outmuscled terroristic methods used in Germany and Italy 30–40 years ago, but they are 30, 40, or 50 years behind society. (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1974b: 91)

In this approach, the RPP attempted to widen the definition of terrorism to include right-wing violence in order to counter right-wing accusations that terrorism was synonymous with communism.

Terrorism, according to the RPP, should be defined as reactionary actions directed at progressive elements of society. This description had political ramifications, as the Turkish Right sought to demonize the RPP by accusing it of sponsoring or defending divisive or subversive groups and movements. By doing so, the RPP was able to remove itself from these accusations while also including neo-fascist violence in the definition of terrorism (Beyribey, 2022). Terrorism, according to the RPP, was defined as violent assaults carried out by those who have been influenced by political extremism from both the left and the right. "Terrorism has no right and left," Deniz Baykal argued. He went on to say that the Turkish Right is made up of "those who are unable to confront right-wing terrorism," while RPP legislators "were able to withstand left-wing terrorism." As a result, "[the Turkish Right] could not say anything about the possible left-wing terrorist assaults," because they made no mention of right-wing terrorism (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 109). As a result, the RPP could portray itself as a reasonable actor in the Turkish politics, as it did not dismiss any form of "terrorist" activity.

Terrorism has two basic meanings in this narrative. On one hand, history was viewed as a linear process, and the remnants of the *ancien regime* used terrorism. As a result, the history of terrorism has been marked by conflicts between progressives and reactionaries, as evidenced by Deniz Baykal's speech on the subject. Terrorism, he claimed, was as old as human history, citing terrorists like "the ones who assassinated Hasan ibn Ali and Huseyn ibn Ali in Karbala" and "the ones who shot [Mustafa Fehmi] Kubilay [in Menemen]" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 41).[5] By expanding the time frame of the power struggle, this historical narrative of terrorism universalized the power struggle against the Turkish Right and resisted the "universal" definition of them, which referred to the problematization of international communism in the West as the only "truth" about terrorism.

The second connotation was that terrorism was directed against all of Turkish society.[6] This was a fundamental distinction from the Turkish Right, because terrorism was characterized as violent attacks against the Turkish state and nation, as previously stated. Terrorism was interpreted as a class war in the RPP narrative. Workers were

targeted in terrorist acts in order to "crush the democratic components of society" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975a: 198). It was considered that society was divided into two parts: on one hand, there was a tiny group of imperialist exploiters and collaborators who benefited from the unequal connections with Turkish society, and on the other hand, there was a large populace that was exploited (Zürcher, 2017). Terrorism was a tool used by exploiters and accomplices to suppress society's progressive elements.

Terrorism, according to the RPP legislators, was directed against democracy rather than the state. The NAP and its youth branch, the Grey Wolves, were accused of endangering Turkey's democratic order, such as accusing Alparslan Türkeş of being a "would-be Hitler who wants to transform Turkey into Nazi Germany" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 617), the NAP of being a "terrorist political movement" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975c: 559) whose youth branch, the Idealist Hearths "return our country to the dark days of Nazi Germany and create right-wing terrorism" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975a: 199). In this sense, the neo-fascist NAP and the Grey Wolves were seen as a threat to democracy. This viewpoint is consistent with the RRP's terrorism narrative, which depicts terrorism as a regressive tool used by imperialist powers such as the capitalist Western countries, specifically the United States. The NAP and the Grey Wolves were defined as "representatives of an antique notion" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975a: 198) and "a militant group conditioned for dark and archaic purposes" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1976a: 727). The Grey Wolves, in particular, were compared to "Hitler's SS thugs or Mussolini's Blackshirts," who were labeled as "committers of terrorism crime, which is a crime against humanity" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 181). As a result, neo-fascist organizations were thought to be targeting progressive and democratic elements of society with terrorism.

The state was in an unclear position in this terrorism narrative. On one hand, RPP legislators debated whether or not state terrorism could be considered. In this regard, the RPP was not opposed to any form of expressions of state terrorism. State terrorism, on the other hand, was thought to occur only in certain circumstances. To put it another way, state terrorism was only conceivable when specific state policies were put in place to facilitate right-wing terrorism. As a result, state terrorism had a context. To counter this flaw in the state terrorism narrative, RPP legislators contended that when the state was targeted, it was for its takeover rather than its destruction or separation, as the Turkish Right alleged. In this way, the relationship between terrorism and the state was viewed as symbiotic rather than adversarial. According to an RPP legislator, "the segments who benefit from the crooked system committed violent and homicidal activities against the youth to take over the state and create the capitalist dictatorship" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1976a: 727). This statement also highlights the terrorism versus democracy dichotomy, as neo-fascist movements sought to seize power through force, while the RPP saw itself as waging a just war against them. As a result, when the Turkish Right formed a government, RPP legislators discussed how "the young people were shot to death in broad daylight with the efforts of the government's head and his Hitler-wannabe deputy prime minister and their allies within the state" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1976a: 386).

When the RPP legislators trans-nationalized terrorism, the NAP and the Grey Wolves were labeled as collaborators of international capital seeking to keep Turkey in its

underdeveloped state. In other words, the imperialist countries exploited the domestic component of terrorism in Turkey. Terrorism was exacerbated by those forces, and they found domestic allies in the Grey Wolves, who helped them attack "progressive" elements of society including workers, university students, and intellectuals. The Grey Wolves, according to RPP legislators, were "fascist militants of monopolist capital and interest groups" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975a: 198), terrorism was the result of "the Nationalist Front Government, multinational companies, and the CIA" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1975b: 406), and "anti-communism imported from the United States is being used to create terror in the manner of medieval zealotry" (TGNA Proceedings Journal, 1976b: 232).

The RPP legislators maintained that the progressives were on the right track since they were fighting imperialism, and the Grey Wolves were being "unleashed" on them to weaken the fight from inside. As a result, the RPP resisted the definition of terrorism, which emerged during Operation Sledgehammer and was propagated by the Turkish Right, by trans-nationalizing the narrative in terms of conservative and regressive forces. This meant that the RPP universalized a terrorism narrative in order to fight the ostensibly "universal" narrative of the Turkish Right that had acquired traction in the West throughout the 1970s, building on the Third World narrative that was gaining traction around the world.

Conclusion

This article proposes that the concept of terrorism can be examined as a site for a power struggle among various political actors in order to advance their normative subjectivities. This article aims to examine how terrorism was problematized in Turkey in the early 1970s, and how political actors, specifically the RPP, which occupied the center-left, and the Turkish Right, used the concept of terrorism to strengthen or oppose their power positions. This aspect of terrorism is important to grasp in order to comprehend its problematization. Terrorism can be examined as a power play involving a number of authoritative actors and institutions, including governments, bureaucratic organizations, and, to a degree, the media. However, a crucial aspect in the critical analysis of terrorism is to understand how specific type of political violence has been problematized as terrorism and become a conceptual site of contestation for political actors. As Foucault (1982) pointed out, power and resistance are simultaneous, and it would be difficult to analyze the concept of terrorism without considering power-struggling actors. The data from the Turkish case that was provided for this study illustrates the dynamics of contestations around terrorism on a global scale. The Turkish example demonstrates how the concept of terrorism may be a site of power struggle among different political actors seeking to strengthen or resist preexisting power relations. Thus, power struggles containing competing narratives are always possible in relation to the concept of terrorism.

The fact that both the Turkish Right and the RPP believed terrorism to be a form of political violence makes it intelligible. This point is significant because it shows how the political actors tried to problematize the political violence that was occurring while simultaneously reifying the power struggle over the concept of terrorism. The "tactical reversibility of discourse" should therefore be discussed when talking about the

problematization of terrorism (Foucault, 2003: 208). As seen in the Turkish example, the Turkish Right and the RPP both claimed that terrorism was used as a "weapon" by certain elements to subjugate the nation to foreign powers or international capital, respectively. They acknowledged that terrorism was a violent act, but they constantly blamed the other side for the violence. In other words, they were able to unite around a similar subject of struggle thanks to their shared knowledge that terrorism was a form of violence. However, they problematized violence by referencing the "universal" assertions that were meant to provide an explanation for why it occurs.

Moreover, the Turkish example shows how the international construction of terrorism can be reproduced in domestic politics or contested with different narratives. In doing so, it disrupts the construction of the discourse of terrorism at the global level and offers the chance to investigate how domestic power struggles intersect with global narratives. Different political actors advanced terrorism to represent their power struggles by universalizing it as a specific sort of political violence. Terrorism, according to the Turkish Right, was an international communist plot against Turkey. To make Turkey its satellite, it recruited some partners to weaken the Turkish state and destabilize the country. As a result, terrorism was based on the nationality versus separatism dichotomy: they were separatists and traitors who sought to destroy the state and nation in contrast to the country's nationalists, who were supposed to make up the majority of the population. The RPP, on the contrary, employed the progression versus regression dichotomy to oppose the Turkish Right's narrative of terrorism. Terrorism, in their eyes, was an imperialist plot to keep Turkey under the control of domestic collaborators who were aided by the corrupt exploiting system. Terrorists were mostly members of the neo-fascist Grey Wolves, who were accused of targeting and murdering progressives. This demonstrates how dominant narratives are never simply accepted but are instead constantly contested.

From the Turkish experience, it can be discussed that the terrorism discourse has conflicting and convergent narratives within itself, and the idea of terrorism is defined by this ongoing fight of universalities. Along these lines, political actors' narratives for constituting specific types of subjectivities and rejecting others can be construed as universal if they are trans-nationalized to the point of an ever-ending struggles in the history of man. In other words, as this article aims to show, political actors claim that their narrative of terrorism is "universally" accepted, thus reflecting their domestic power struggle into international struggles. This shows that in the analysis of the discourse of terrorism, it is important to scrutinize the intersections between the national and international narratives to understand how political actors reconstruct specific concepts to deploy them in their power struggles. Therefore, adding power struggles among universalized narratives on terrorism to the analysis of terrorism discourse can lead to a new perspective. In the study of "universalization" of terrorism, the question of how diverse terrorism narratives can be interpreted may increase the possibilities of critical terrorism studies and thinking on national discourses being intertwined with international issues.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Sofia Verza, Ersin İçöz, and Okan Gülbak for reading and commenting on an earlier version of the paper. The author also thanks the editors and reviewers.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Tuncer Beyribey https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2261-4148

Notes

1. It is worth noting that, as Erlenbusch-Anderson (2018) points out, the problematization of terrorism in the 1970s was an instance, not the instance. This means that the concept of terror has multiple historical interpretations that may be traced back to the revolutionaries in France. However, in this case, this refers to the Western world's new interpretation of terrorism as a form of "international communism."
2. However, as a result of the change in the electoral system, the party lost numerous seats after the 1969 elections. The electoral method used in the 1965 elections was a national remnant system, which favors smaller parties and almost equalizes the overall number of votes and the proportion of parliamentary seats. In the 1969 elections, this was abandoned in order to remove the smaller parties. As a result, despite receiving roughly identical percentages of votes, the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT) was only able to gain two seats in parliament.
3. It is important to remember that these groups, particularly the Grey Wolves, had close ties to the state's elites, despite the fact that this is difficult to prove. According to Jacoby (2010), the Grey Wolves were part of the CIA's general network, such as Gladio, and the neo-fascist mobilization was backed by several high-ranking army commanders and the National Intelligence Association. As a result, it is possible that the rise of anti-communist organizations is a direct result of the organic interaction between fascist crowds and some state security officials.
4. It is significant to consider the makeup of the Erim Government in this regard: some of the ministers came from the World Bank, the OECD, OYAK (a military pension fund that controls the OYAK Holding, one of Turkey's largest industrial conglomerates), and TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Company, a state-controlled company).
5. Hasan ibn Ali and Huseyn ibn Ali were Prophet Mohammad's grandsons. After his father Ali ibn Mohammad was elected caliph, Hasan was deposed by Muawiyah I, who created the Umayyad Dynasty. Yazid I, the second monarch of the Umayyad Dynasty, killed Huseyn ibn Ali in the Battle of Karbala. These events widened the schism between Sunnis and Shias in Islam. Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay was an officer who was assassinated and decapitated by a group of sectarians protesting the Ataturk government's secularist reforms in 1930, after he was authorized to calm the crowd. Today, he is regarded as a symbol of secular principles.
6. In Turkey, the rightist has been using *millet* (nation), while the leftist has been using *halk* (society) to define the general population. The major difference was that the former one imagines the population as an organic unity, while the latter one understands it in more class-based ordered, meaning that *halk* corresponds to the masses or the oppressed majority.

References

Ahmad F (1977) *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Ahmad F (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London and New York: Routledge.

Akgün B (2002) Twins or enemies: comparing nationalist and islamist traditions in Turkish politics. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6(1): 17–35.

Alper E (2010) Reconsidering social movements in Turkey: the case of the 1968–71 protest cycle. *New Perspectives on Turkey* 43: 63–96.

Alper E (2014) Protest diffusion and rising political violence in the Turkish ’68 movement: the Arab-Israeli war, “Paris May” and the hot summer of 1968. In: Bosi L, Demetriou C and Malthaner S (eds) *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 255–274.

Atılgan G (2017) “68” in Kapıları. In: Kaynar MK (ed.) *Türkiye’nin 1960’lı Yılları*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 315–340.

Bevir M (1999) Foucault, power, and institutions. *Political Studies* 47(2): 345–359.

Beyribey T (2022) Terörist ozneyi Tarihselleştirmek: İktidar İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Türkiye’de Terörizm Söyleminin İnşası (1973-1980). *Alternatif Politika* 14(3): 582–611.

Bigo D (2000) When two become one: internal and external securitisations in Europe. In: Kelstrup M and Williams MC (eds) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 171–204.

Bigo D (2001) Migration and security. In: Guiraudon V and Joppke C (eds) *Controlling a New Migration World*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 121–149.

Bigo D (2017) International political sociology: rethinking the international through dynamics of power. In: Basaran T, Bigo D, Emmanuel-Pierre G, et al. (eds) *International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 24–48.

Blain M (2007) On the genealogy of terrorism. In: Staines B (ed.) *Interrogating the War on Terror*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 49–66.

Bonditti P (2017) Violence and the modern international: an archeology of terrorism. In: Bonditti P, Bigo D and Gros F (eds) *Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies for the Study of World Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 155–174.

Bozarslan H (2009) Türkiye’de Siyasi Şiddetin Fikri Kaynakları. In Laçiner Ö (ed.) *Türkiye’de Modern Siyasi Düşünce 9: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 370–385.

Bozarslan H (2020) From kemalism to the armed struggle: radicalization of the left in the 1960s. In: Pekesen B (ed.) *Turkey in Turmoil: Social Change and Political Radicalization during the 1960s*. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, pp. 115–136.

Campbell D (2000) Contradictions of a lone superpower. In: Slater D and Taylor PJ (eds) *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*. New York: Blackwell, pp. 222–240.

Campos JH II (2007) *The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power*. London and New York: Routledge.

Cizre-Sakallıoğlu Ü (1992) The ideology and politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey. *CEMOTI: Cahiers d’etudes sur la Mediterranee orientale et le monde turco-iranien* 13: 141–164.

Criss NB (2002) A short history of Anti-Americanism and terrorism: the Turkish case. *Journal of American History* 89(2): 472–484.

Deacon R (2000) Theory as practice: Foucault’s concept of problematization. *Telos* 118: 127–142.

Dean M (1994) *Critical and Effective Histories*. London and New York: Routledge.

Ditrych O (2014) *Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism: Identity, Genealogy and State*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Erdem T (2001) The politics of squatter (Gecekondu) studies in Turkey: the changing representations of rural migrants in the academic discourse. *Urban Studies* 38(7): 983–1002.

Erlenbusch-Anderson V (2018) *Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Erlenbusch-Anderson V (2022) Historicizing white supremacist terrorism with Ida B. Wells. *Political Theory* 50(2): 275–304.
Foucault M (1982) The subject and power. *Critical Inquiry* 8(4): 777–795.
Foucault M (1988) *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings*. London and New York: Routledge.
Foucault M (1990) *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*. New York: Vintage.
Foucault M (2001) *Fearless Speech*. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
Foucault M (2003) *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*. New York: Picador.
Genosko G (2009) Afterword: subjects matter. In: Reynolds B (ed.) *Transversal Subjects: From Montaigne to Deleuze after Derrida*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 262–271.
Gilson EC (2014) Ethics and the ontology of freedom: problematization and responsiveness in Foucault and Deleuze. *Foucault Studies* 17: 76–98.
Gourisse B (2022) In the name of the state: the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the genesis of political violence during the 1970s. *Turkish Studies* 22(1): 56–76.
Grigoriadis IN (2011) Redefining the nation: shifting boundaries of the "Other" in Greece and Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies* 47(1): 167–182.
Gümrükçü SB (2022) Ideology, discourse, and alliance structures: explaining far-right political violence in Turkey in the 1970s. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Epub ahead of print 22 February. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2021.1895121.
Gunter MM (1989) Political instability in Turkey during the 1970s. *Journal of Conflict Studies* 9(1): 63–77.
Jackson R (2005) *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Jacoby T (2010) Political violence, the "War on Terror" and the Turkish military. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 3(1): 99–118.
Jarvis L (2009) *Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Keyder Ç (1987) The political economy of Turkish democracy. In: Schick IC and Tonak EA (eds) *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–65.
Koopman C (2013) *Geneology as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity*. Bloomington, IN; Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
Landau JM (1982) The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey. *Journal of Contemporary History* 17(4): 587–606.
Li D (2020) *The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lilja M (2018) The politics of time and temporality in Foucault's theorisation of resistance: ruptures, time-lags and decelerations. *Journal of Political Power* 11(3): 419–432.
McQuade J (2021) *A Genealogy of Terrorism: Colonial Law and the Origins of an Idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martini A (2016) The construction of the discourse on "Terrorism." *Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science* 30: 92–105.
Martini A (2020) The Syrian wars of words: international and local instrumentalisations of the war on terror. *Third World Quarterly*: 725–743.
Meier A (2020) The idea of terror: institutional reproduction in government responses to political violence. *International Studies Quarterly* 64(3): 499–509.
Mello B (2007) Political process and the development of labor insurgency in Turkey, 1945–80. *Social Movement Studies* 6(3): 207–225.

Muehlenhoff HL (2016) Ambiguities of power: struggle and resistance in (the relations between) Turkey and the European Union. *Cooperation and Conflict* 51(3): 291–306.
Neal AW (2004) Cutting off the King's head: Foucault's society must be defended and the problem of sovereignty. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29(4): 373–398.
Neal AW (2008) Goodbye war on terror? Foucault and Butler on discourses of law, war and exceptionalism. In: Dillon M and Neal AW (eds) *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 43–64.
Norris P, Kern M and Just M (2003) Framing terrorism. In: Norris P, Kern M and Just M (eds) *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 3–23.
Oksala J (2011) Lines of fragility: a Foucauldian critique of violence. In: Yates C and Eckstrand N (eds) *Philosophy and the Return of Violence: Studies from This Widening Gyre*. New York: Continuum, pp. 154–170.
Örnek C (2015) *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı: Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi*. İstanbul: Can Yayınları.
Örnek C and Üngör Ç (2013) Introduction Turkey's cold war: global influences, local manifestations. In: Örnek C and Üngör Ç (eds) *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–18.
Özman A and Yazıcı Yakın A (2012) The symbolic construction of communism in Turkish anticommunist propaganda during the cold war. *Journal of Language and Politics* 11(4): 583–605.
Öztan GG and Özekmekçi Mİ (2014) Anti-Communist propaganda of Turkish armed forces during the cold war. *International Journal of Turcologia* 9(17): 47–76.
Prime Ministry (1973) *Beyaz Kitap: Türkiye Gerçekleri Ve Terörizm [The Truths in Turkey and Terrorism]*. Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık.
Puar JK and Rai AS (2002) Monster, terrorist, fag: the war on terrorism and the production of docile patriots. *Social Text* 20(3): 17–148.
Raphael S (2009) In the service of power: terrorism studies and US intervention in the global South. In: Jackson R, Breen Smyth M and Gunning J (eds) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 49–65.
Sayarı S (1978) The Turkish party system in transition. *Government and Opposition* 13(1): 39–57.
Sayarı S (2010) Political violence and terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: a retrospective analysis. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22(2): 198–215.
Stampnitzky L (2013) *Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented "Terrorism"* New York: Cambridge University Press.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1974a) Period: 4, Volume: 2, Assembly: 1.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1974b) Period: 4, Volume: 7, Assembly: 2.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1975a) Period: 4, Volume: 8, Assembly: 2.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1975b) Period: 4, Volume: 9, Assembly: 2.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1975c) Period: 4, Volume: 10, Assembly: 2.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1976a) Period: 4, Volume: 14, Assembly: 3.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1976b) Period: 4, Volume: 15, Assembly: 3.
TGNA Proceedings Journal (1976c) Period: 4, Volume: 16, Assembly: 3.
Toros H (2012) *Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach*. London and New York: Routledge.
Turan Ö (2013) Alternatif tahayyüller, devingenlik, popülizm: 1970'ler için bir çerçeve denemesi. *Toplum ve Bilim* 127: 3–25.

Yeğen M (2007) Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(1): 119–151.
Zürcher EJ (2017) *Turkey: A Modern History* (4th edn). London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Author biography

Tuncer Beyribey is a researcher who received his PhD degree in International Relations from Marmara University, Istanbul, in 2021. He was research assistant at the Marmara University. His research interests include the genealogy of the discourse of terrorism in Turkey and Foucauldian analysis of political and state violence.