

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INTRODUCTION

Rising powers in international conflict management: an introduction

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ABSTRACT

This introductory article sheds light on commonalities and divergences in a selected group of rising powers' (namely Brazil, India, China and Turkey) understanding and applications of conflict management and attempts to explain the priorities in their conflict management strategies from conceptual/theoretical and empirical aspects. The case studies in this special issue point to the evolving nature of conflict management policies of rising powers as a result of their changing priorities in foreign and security policy and the shifts observed in the international order since the end of the Cold War. The country specific perspectives provided in this issue have also proven right the potentialities of rising powers in managing conflicts, as well as their past and ongoing challenges in envisaging crises in both their own regions and extra-regional territories. The article begins by decoding the driving factors of rising powers' conflict management strategies and their commonalities and divergences in peacebuilding policies. It then jumps into the theoretical and conceptual assessment of their conflict management approaches. In the third part, the issue delves into the evidence-based assessment their converging and differing conflict management policies depending on the nature of the conflict, its involving actors and its geographical location.

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Introduction

What kind of actors are rising powers in international conflict management? Are they active or passive conflict resolution actors? Do they pursue similar conflict and crisis management policies at the regional and global level or do they have diverging discourses and practices in the management of international crises? These are fundamental questions in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of rising powers as conflict management actors and peacebuilders at the regional and international levels. As status-seeking actors in a changing international order, rising powers make use of a series of conflict management strategies including prevention, mediation, peacebuilding and adjudication. With the emergence of 'new wars', new security threats emanating from violent non-state actors and an increasing number of factors leading to civil war conditions across the world,[1] conflict is changing and thus needs to be managed differently by major and rising powers. In the contemporary

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complex security environment, rising powers face several challenges affecting both their approaches to conflict and what tools they use to manage these conflicts. The current volatile security environment requires stronger collaboration and cooperation in diplomatic and military coercion and global counter-terrorism. For instance, the ongoing civil war in Syria has highlighted several divergences among major powers and rising states in how they assess the gradual degradation of civil war conditions and seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. In contrast to expectations, rising powers failed to develop a common peacebuilding approach to the Syrian civil war and a unified position determining the conditions of a peaceful settlement in Syria.

Despite the existence of a robust literature on conflict management,[2] a very limited number of studies have dealt with the approaches and understandings of rising powers to international conflict management. This study aims to fulfil this lacuna by offering a holistic framework of the assessment of how rising powers approach and strategise conflict management. In fact, rising powers' strong criticism of the current international order and their willingness to upgrade their international status to become viable actors that may compete with major powers in global governance policy areas run in parallel with their increasing desire to actively participate in international conflict management. The second novelty of this paper is its examination of multiple rising powers such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey as conflict management actors engaged in sustaining regional and global peace by the use of their prioritised conflict management instruments.

With this in mind, this special issue aims to locate rising powers in the international conflict management tableau and to decrypt their main motives and limitations in the enactment of their peacebuilding role. In doing so, it delves into the analysis of their positioning towards international crises from a comparative perspective and attempts to understand the effectiveness and functionality of the conflict mechanisms and tools they utilise as part of their preferred peacebuilding strategy. In this vein, this introductory article begins by decoding the driving factors of rising powers' conflict management strategies and their commonalities and divergences in peacebuilding policies. It then jumps into the theoretical and conceptual assessment of conflict management approaches of rising powers. In the third part, the issue delves into the evidence-based assessment of a group of selected rising powers' converging and differing conflict management policies depending on the nature of the conflict, its involving actors and its geographical location.

1. Decrypting rising powers as international conflict management actors

In the current post-Western international order, almost all major actors, including rising powers, have begun to redefine their international roles and responsibilities in successfully responding to global challenges. Both traditional and rising powers pursue either convergent or divergent policies depending on their mutual and differing interests. Their responses to ongoing shifts in the international order also vary according to their differing expectations and gains from the existing multilateral mechanisms and rules of today's global governance. The last decade has also witnessed significant shifts in the status politics of emerging powers entering into global competition with traditional powers on multiple fronts such as economics-trade, diplomacy and hard and soft power.[3] In addition, rising powers' relative increase in material power sources and diplomatic leverage in global affairs has also drawn

a great deal of attention to both their bilateral and multilateral relations with the rest of the world.[4] Moreover, rising powers' strong attachment to the Westphalian norms of sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs and their ongoing criticism of the unjust Western-dominated liberal order also impact the way they conceive and construct their role in sustaining international peace and security. Added to this are their own conceptions of the international order, the nature and the components of their strategic culture, and their self-perception of the international responsibilities they have committed to for sustaining peace and preventing conflict. These conceptions determine the willingness of rising powers to actively involve themselves in managing international conflicts.

The rising powers are not a homogeneous group of states with similar responses to international conflicts and, as such, it is not an easy task to holistically assess their conflict management approaches and strategies. However, four driving factors can be observed as determining the construction of their conflict management policies: self-interests-based preferences, status-seeking attitudes, cost-oriented normative approach and region-focused priorities. The second driving factor, status seeking attitudes, mean that international recognition and prestige also play a key role in the shaping of rising powers' approaches to international conflict. Here, status refers to the voluntary deference of others.[5] Rising powers may also engage in an active role in international conflict management in order to gain legitimacy and authority in the international system. The cost-oriented normative approach, the third driving factor, signifies that rising powers tend to comply with the existing norms within the existing institutions in conflict management if the costs of challenging them is high. When the costs of challenging the existing norms and institutions are low, however, they may revise or create new ones according to their interests.[6] As the forth driving point, region-focused priorities represent the importance of geographical proximity in the determination of rising powers' conflict management strategies.

Self-interests-based preferences

Self-interests-based preferences reflect that, while engaging in a conflict as a third actor aiming to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, rising powers act in conformity with their national interests-based preferences. Departing from this, it can be claimed that rising powers aim to preserve their own interests at the economic, political and economic levels in international crises. Thus, the greater extent to which a conflict affects their interests, a nation shows greater willingness to take part in its management. In addition, rising powers seek to reduce the number of conflicts in the international system by involving other like-minded nations in their attempt to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis by the use of multilateral channels and institutions. Similar to middle-ranged powers, they attempt to pre-empt, contain and resolve conflicts. Rising powers also show grand inclination to play a mediation role in high profile international conflicts since the reduction of conflicts positively affect their political and economic well-being.

Rising powers show some similar behavioural patterns in the realm of conflict management as well. One of the most important patterns is free-riding. From a rationalist point of view, rising powers are generally inclined to act as free-riders to the traditional powers, even if their involvement in the conflict as a third party might damage their material interests. For instance, while China would free-ride on the US in the management of conflicts triggered in the Middle East, Japan and South Korea allegedly do the same for conflicts in East Asia.

Another aspect of free-riding of rising powers to major powers is closely related with the material gains that rising powers obtain from free-riding in case of their (dis)involvement in conflicts. There also exists some difficulties for major powers in cooperating with rising powers in conflict management mainly due to their differing values and interests in the preservation of the liberal world order. Even rising powers that are more democratic and Western-oriented may also break with their Western allies on many security-related and geopolitical issues (e.g. Turkey). In case of the existence of overriding interests, rising powers may cooperate with major powers in sustaining peace through conflict management. A closer assessment of the current international conflict landscape clearly proves how rising powers prioritise their self-interests during the involvement in international conflicts as third parties and peace brokers. For instance, China's mediation in the North Korean nuclear crisis and Russia's Syrian engagement are all closely linked with their material and ideational interests.

Status-seeking attitudes

Rising powers are generally inclined to achieve higher status and recognition in world politics and thus pursue active foreign policies in multiple fields of global governance, from peacekeeping to climate change. Their quest for status also turn them into transformative actors seeking reform and revision in the international system. Peacebuilding in general and conflict management in particular constitute important aspects of the status-seeking policies of rising powers.[7] In this regard, rising powers give support to UN-led and non-UN-led peacekeeping operations depending on their regional priorities as well as their ideational preferences including their soft power strategies. In short, rising powers' status politics are also strongly informed by their differing approaches to peacebuilding. Given their differing historical experiences, geographic locations, cultural affinities and economic and political priorities, rising powers may give distinctive reactions to the same international conflicts. In line with this, they may cooperate to prevent, stop or transform conflicts if this would bring them enhanced status and prestige in the sphere of global governance. China's lead in the fight against climate change or its substantial cooperation against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by joining UN sanctions against North Korea are some contemporary examples of such status politics.

However, the status concerns of rising powers push them to increase their notoriety in many policy areas of international politics including conflict management and prevention. Almost all rising powers pursue status seeking behaviours in the realm of peacebuilding and this may affect the outcomes of their relations with major powers, formal and informal international organisations, less developed and developing countries, etc. Rising powers' demand for higher status and prestige is thus a key factor in their international security policies.

Cost-oriented normative approach

Another commonality of rising powers in the sphere of conflict management is their cost-oriented normative approach to conflicts. Despite their relatively weak institutional power and normative setting, rising powers have a general tendency to calculate costs before taking a new normative initiative such as the creation of new institutions. If the cost of creating

new institutions or challenging them is high, rising powers prefer to comply with the existing structures or reform the existing institutions and their mechanisms but tend to change them by creating new ones if the relative costs are lower. This cost-based approach is not only valid in the field of conflict management. In many issue areas of global governance such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, international terrorism and economic and financial governance, rising powers have adopted policies based on cost calculations in the pursuit of their normative preferences. The establishment by BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries of the BRICS Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Fund demonstrates their level of discomfort with the existing global financial institutions dominated by traditional powers and can be regarded as an end-result of their cost-based normative policies. However, in the field of conflict management, especially at the regional level, rising powers prefer in most of cases to act alone or together with a small number of regional states. They rarely cooperate with major powers in regional crisis due to their strong commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of third countries. The reluctance of rising powers like India, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, China in the involvement in the Syrian crisis is a good example of the cost-oriented normative approach in taking actions in the management of international crisis.

Region-focused priorities

Most of the current security threats impacting rising powers can be found and addressed at the regional level. The existence of negative security externalities and the use of regional conflict management tools such as the presence of institutional and normative settings and values are key to the success or failure of conflict management at the regional level. If the conflict's negative externalities are high, which means that the conflict has an overriding and significant negative impact on other regional countries, the incentive for conflict management will be higher. The more negative externalities spill over, the more conflict management efforts are initiated. However, in certain cases the existence of a high number of negative externalities could be detrimental to the effective use of conflict management tools due to the involvement of many actors in the conflict. A good example of this is the Syrian case where, as a result of the crisis' increasing negative externalities to regional countries, more actors have become involved in the conflict and this has complicated its management.

Here it must also be emphasised that rising powers have weaker capacities compared to traditional powers in setting out working institutional design for conflict management. The institutionalisation of conflict management as a norm is a difficult task since it requires uniting different identities, interests, priorities and values under a common peacebuilding system. Rising powers are either not a part of such effective international institutions or lack strong institution and norm-building capabilities. This lack of sufficient power capacities pushes them to deal more bilaterally than multilaterally with conflicts. They even engage in coercive power to limit the conflict's spillover to neighbouring regions. Rising powers give the impression of adopting a mix of two strategies for conflict management: bilateral or autonomous and multilateral. However, compared to traditional powers, rising powers seem to be more willing to take initiative within the existing international bodies to either prevent conflicts or find resolutions to conflicts. China's effort to initiate Six-Party Talks to address the North Korean nuclear crisis, and when it failed,

to seek a solution to the Korean crisis through the UN Security Council, is one such example of rising powers' dual approach to conflicts. In regional conflicts, more specifically those in which national interests are under threat, rising powers do not hesitate to use coercive conflict management tools, making their conflict management strategy more autonomous and independent. However, conflict management necessitates a holistic multilateral approach to peacebuilding covering multiple policy applications from peacekeeping to mediation, from mediation to development cooperation, and from development cooperation to adjudication. Turkey's management of the Syrian crisis is a good example of rising powers' dual approach to conflict resolution based on a mix of bilateral and multilateral strategies. On a bilateral basis, Turkey uses both diplomatic and military tools to prevent the conflict's diffusion into its territories. At the regional level, its engagement in establishing an ad-hoc coalition with the other two regional states involved in the crisis (Russia and Iran), resulting in the launch of a series of Astana talks, also illustrates how its Syrian conflict management strategy's bilateral and autonomous components outweigh its multilateral ones.

2. Profiling rising powers in peacebuilding from theoretical and conceptual perspectives

In his article *Interests or Ideas? Explaining Brazil's Surge in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding,* Charles T. Call assesses Brazil's increasing activism in peacebuilding since the 2000s from a theoretical approach. For Call, Brazil is one of several rising powers that have assumed greater protagonism in advancing peace on the global stage and in the global South beginning in the early 2000s. The author states that in Haiti, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, Brazil expanded its peacekeeping deployments and leadership and exercised leadership on peacebuilding issues. More generally, it sought to lead efforts to reform and democratise the global order through the Security Council and South–South alliances such as the BRICS Alliance and IBSA. Its development cooperation tripled from 2003 to 2010 and it sought to shift norms on issues such as the Responsibility to Protect commitment.

In his article the author mainly investigates the reasons behind Brazil's increased activity in peace-related issues. He questions whether this activism can be best understood from the perspectives of the classic realist behaviour of middle powers seeking to rise in the global pecking order or of new liberal commitment to enhanced integrated approaches to global trade and order. Call continues by asking if post-colonial theories find support Brazil's proclaimed attempt to try to transform the Western-dominated overly militarised approach to global peace and security and if Brazil's identity as a developmental, non-interventionist middle power expressing solidarity with other former colonies helps explain its new peacebuilding policies.

The article tests the four core international relations theories of realism, liberalism, constructivism and post-colonial theory to explain the rise and content of Brazil's peacebuilding policies. Departing from the argument that Brazil has been vocal in its non-traditional approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the author examines the extent to which its rhetorical claims make sense and contends that this study can bring systematic theoretical thinking to a case whose empirics have been used to support each of the four main theoretical approaches.

In the final analysis based on literature on Brazil's operations and on personal interviews with senior Brazilian diplomats, Call argues that interest-based theories such as realism and liberalism best account for the emergence of Brazil's increased peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives in the early 2000s. However, idea-based constructivist and post-colonial approaches are necessary to account for the content of these approaches that reflect national identity and social and culturally historic experiences.

In their article *Pragmatic Eclecticism, Neoclassical Realism, and Post-Structuralism: Reconsidering the Libyan Crisis of 2011*, Gelot and Welz draw on Sil and Katzenstein's notion of 'analytical eclecticism' to analyse the botched African Union (AU) initiative to lead the management of the 2011 Libyan crisis. While the crisis for some render redundant the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' due to the AU's lack of internal cohesion, others emphasise the obstruction of the AU's Libya mediation plan by outside powers. Both views share the understanding that Africa's rise in political terms was curbed through the AU's inability to claim the lead mediator role in the Libyan crisis.

Gelot and Welz develop an original 'eclectic typology' by recombining theoretical and substantive elements from two distinct research traditions, post-structuralism and neoclassical realism, and identifying contact zones between them. The typology comprises the categories 'primacy of power, 'discourses' and 'images of leaders'. According to Gelot and Welz, both neoclassical realist and poststructuralist arguments as applied to AU's crisis management in Libya can be used to deconstruct the predominant narrative's advancement of liberal cosmopolitan motivations behind the intervention in Libya and is strongly related to the principle of the responsibility-to-protect (R2P). The authors show how the approach taken to Libya in 2011 depended on three justificatory moves linked to the three categories: a predominance of power towards a cosmopolitan liberal end, a legitimising discourse and the construction of an image of Gaddafi in world politics. For instance, the authors unpack the many contextual and multilevel factors involved in explaining why the AU's mediation plan was dismissed as out of sync with events and as dangerously naïve. Once the UNSC authorised the no-fly zone over Libya, a predominant discourse took hold that effectively limited the political choices at hand for the AU and African states.

Gelot and Welz also underline the fact that the image of Gaddafi as an intolerable and incorrigible tyrant helped advance the view among many Western powers that Libya faced a historic opportunity to liberalise and that the social forces demanding democracy and freedom in Libya needed outside assistance. The authors highlight the material and non-material power of states involved in side-lining the AU's opposition to forcible regime change. In their final analysis, the authors concluded that while the AU is an indispensable partner to major powers in many crisis situations in Africa today, the careful unpacking of many interrelated factors enabled by analytical eclecticism is important to explain why its crisis management role was so undesirable in Libya in 2011. In this regard, the politics of rouging/derouging Gaddafi depended more on geopolitics and economic realism than concern for the Libyan people and the unity among major powers to uphold and implement the R2P principle in Libya is open to critical investigation. In sum, the typology shows how insights from two or more theoretical perspectives can offer novel perspectives that satisfy both researchers and practitioners and such joint perspectives are more inclusive of contextual and multi-level factors.

In the essay *Reluctant Powers? Rising Powers' Contributions to Regional Crisis Management*, Sandra Destradi approaches the issue of rising powers' international conflict management

initiatives by adopting the analytical lens of 'reluctance' and focusing on the regional level of analysis. She starts from the observation that rising powers have often been reluctant to engage in conflict management on both global terms and within their regions where they tend to be the predominant countries and where conflicts and instability often create dangerous security externalities. To capture the often ambivalent, indecisive approach of rising powers to regional conflict management, Destradi builds upon her previous work on reluctance in world politics.[8] In her contribution to this special issue, she develops a theorisation of the drivers of reluctance by focusing on difficulties in dealing with competing expectations: that rising powers address different (global, regional, domestic) constituencies at the same time and that by doing so they will pursue reluctant policies. The empirical analysis of India's and Brazil's varying reluctance in regional crisis management confirms this hypothesis.

According to the author, India has been a reluctant crisis manager in the South Asian region. Even under the stable government of Prime Minister Modi, who came to power with a large majority in 2014, India has been unable to contribute to the stabilisation of its region in a consistent manner. In Afghanistan, India has been divided between the expectations of the Afghan government, the US and the 'West' more generally to take over greater responsibilities in matters of security on the one hand and the need to not provoke its rival Pakistan by getting engaged too extensively on the other. In a constitutional crisis in neighbouring Nepal, India has similarly pursued an extremely reluctant, inconsistent approach, which Destradi traces back to competing expectations by domestic constituencies within Nepal and India.

In the case of Brazil, by contrast, the country under President Lula (2003–2011) has pursued a non-reluctant, consistent and responsive approach to regional conflict management as illustrated by the cases of its engagement in the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti as well as its role in the civil war in Colombia. According to Destradi, this was possible because, in the case of Haiti, global and regional actors supported Brazil's leadership and the Brazilian government was able to argumentatively sideline domestic critics of the mission. In the case of Colombia, Brazil's low-key offers of mediation and support were not contradicted by expectations of greater engagement in conflict management, thereby allowing Lula to pursue a coherent, non-reluctant policy. In the final analysis, the author contends that the analysis of India's and Brazil's varying reluctance in regional conflict management through its focus on competing expectations unveils some of the contradictions and tensions that rising powers are subjected to when they are asked to take over greater international responsibilities in matters of security.

3. From theory to practice rising powers in conflict management: case studies

In their article *Rising Powers and the Global Nuclear Order: The Case of India's Integration*, Harsh V. Pant and Arka Biswas ask why India's exceptional partial integration into the global nuclear order was possible and what explains the challenges that remain to India's complete integration. Their article attempts to address these two questions through a structural lens. It begins by laying out the process of India's partial integration into the global nuclear order to date. The article then employs the structural framework to explain how India's integration was possible. The third section examines the extent to which this framework also explains the challenges that remain to India's complete integration. Pant and Biswas depart from the

common argument that India's relationship with the global nuclear order has been unique. The authors state that with its 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974 and decision to not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), India was viewed by the global nuclear order and the larger international system as a pariah nuclear state for decades. The authors remind the reader that, much like other states that acquired nuclear weapons capability after 1 January 1967, India was subject to international criticism and sanctions. The relationship in question was expected to slide further downhill following India's nuclear tests of May 1998 and New Delhi's decision to operationalise its nuclear weapons capability, reflected through its draft nuclear doctrine of 1999 and the official doctrine of 2003. India, however, witnessed a dramatic turnaround in the following decade. In 2000, while the NPT held its review conference, India's then Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, noted in an address to the Indian Parliament that, while India would stay outside the NPT, it would uphold all principles enshrined in the Treaty, especially in curbing horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and related sensitive items.

As underlined by the authors, India's journey has indeed been exceptional, moving from isolation to the successful negotiation of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, the acquisition of a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the definitions of condition for implementing full-scope safeguards to engage in global nuclear commerce in 2008, and membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Australia Group (AG) in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively. However, daunting challenges remain in the completion of India's integration into the global nuclear order and in the debate over India's membership application to the NSG, which forms a critical component of the global nuclear order.

The authors conclude that the structural framework holds credible explanatory power over India's rise in the global nuclear order as well as the challenges that remain to India's complete integration into the order. In the final analysis, the authors explicate what that means for the extant global nuclear order, especially as more rising nuclear powers challenge the order in future.

In her article *Assessing Turkey's Changing Conflict Management Role after the Cold War: Actorness, Approaches, and Tools*, Emel Parlar Dal attempts to profile Turkey as a rising power with its own conflict management understanding and practices. In doing so, the author uses a three-layered embedded framework built on conflict management *actorness*, *approaches* and *tools*. At the actorness level, the author looks at the historical trajectories of Turkey's active, passive or mixed conflict management approaches in international conflicts as a third party. At the second level of approaches, the author assesses Turkey's understanding of conflict management using Bercovitch and Regan's four categories of approaches to conflict management: threat-based, deterrence-based, adjudicatory and accommodationist. Thirdly, the author employs four conflict management tools drawn from Michael J. Butler's four-layered international conflict management applications framework: peacebuilding, mediation, peace enforcement and adjudication.

The author underlines that from the Republican era to the 2000s, Turkey could be considered a cautious and passive actor in international conflict management and distanced itself from regional and global crises, with few exceptions such as Cyprus and Kosovo. The successive Yugoslavian crisis represented a breaking point for Turkey's passive conflict management strategies as conflict management became an important issue policy and the 1990s saw a diversification of tools and practices. As indicated by the author, Turkey pursued both

active and passive conflict management policies between the 1990s and early 2000s and became more active in international conflict management by shifting the nature of its conflict management practices from the military to more civilian-dominated between the 2000s and 2011. With the Syrian war most specifically, Turkey has followed a mix of active and passive conflict management strategies since 2011.

Parlar Dal reaches the following conclusion on Turkey's conflict management approaches: since actorness was largely shaped by its membership to NATO and its special relationship with the US, Turkey's approach to conflict management has generally been accommodationist. The only exception to Turkey's accommodationist understanding during the Cold War was the Cyprus crisis, during which Turkey followed the threat-based, deterrence-based and adjudicatory approaches. During the first decade following the end of the Cold War, Turkey employed traditional and non-traditional methods in managing conflicts from both accommodationist and adjudicatory perspectives. According to the author, with the Arab revolts and the Syrian War most specifically, Turkey began to pursue a mix of active and passive conflict management actorness based mostly on the threat-based and deterrence-based approach (especially with the two recent military operations in Syria).

The author concludes that while Turkey does not possess a coherent peacekeeping strategy, it has become a new player in international mediation utilising more hard than soft power instruments. Parlar Dal also points to the fact that Turkey's mediation in the Syrian war became more selective and less cosmopolitan, leaving Ankara as more an insider partial mediator than an outsider neutral one. The author underlines that, in recent years, peace enforcement has become a widely used conflict management tool. In the use of adjudicative mechanisms, Turkey follows a low-profile policy.

In the final analysis, the author concludes that, with the Syrian war and other regional developments, Turkey has gradually become more a regional than global conflict management actor and more of an autonomous peace provider and peace enforcement-oriented actor than a peacekeeper or a mediator.

In *China's Role in the Regional and International Management of Korean Conflict: An Arbiter or Catalyser?*, authors Hakan Mehmetçik and Ferit Belder look at different role conceptions of China using role theory. As the North Korean nuclear crisis continues, many diverging views on China's role in the conflict have emerged. China's role has been characterised as that of a bystander, arbiter, catalyser and mediator over the years. This chapter seeks to clarify where China stands on North Korea and assess the different phases of the Chinese approach to conflict resolution during the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to the authors, China's current duplicity stems from different priorities at different levels and thus role theory offers a distinct ability to explain this dual position. The authors state that role theory-related concepts have great use in elaborating China's changing role and the external expectations for China's role-taking and role-making patterns. First, it provides theoretically rich and analytically sound explanations. Second, by using role theory concepts we can plunge into spatial and temporal changes and the causes of those changes. To this end, the chapter starts with a conceptual analysis of the role theory and the way in which it can be beneficial to analyse the contending roles of China in the North Korean dispute and its effects on China's patterns of conflict resolution.

The main finding of this chapter is that the role of China within the North Korean conflict can only be assessed with a special focus on the several sets of China's conflicting ascribed and achieved/assumed roles. For the authors, the gap between China's ascribed and

achieved/assumed roles has been closing over the years thanks to socialisation and other diplomatic mechanisms. However, as indicated by the authors, Chinese role adaptation and role contestation is a product of self-identification rather than of international pressures. North Korea races towards the nuclear finishing line and, although it has not already crossed that line, many analysts and politicians see China's role as being crucial to make pression on North Korea for halting its nuclear programme. In the eyes of the authors, this in reality is an immature assessment. In the final analysis, the authors contend that a closer assessment of China's role in the crisis from a role theory point of view shows that China has a limited interest and capacity in assuming the role of external expectations. China's changing role in the crisis basically derives from the fact that both China and other related actors have a high role adaptation. In this regard, this study enhances our theoretical and thematic understanding of China's conflict management strategies with regard to changes in its roles and role sets.

Abigail Kabandula and Timothy M. Shaw position rising powers at the centre of contemporary global politics and economics because they offer alternatives to the established unequal global order in *Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa: Conflicting Regionalism*. Understandably so, the global system is in flux as US global hegemony declines and nationalist (populist and protectionist) movements increase in Europe, the US and elsewhere, forcing Western regimes to prioritise domestic policies. The ongoing domestic turmoil and undiplomatic views of current US President Trump give impetus to middle and rising powers such as the BRICS and Turkey to continue seeking alternative and deeper partnerships in trade, development, peace, security and the environment at micro- and macro-regional levels.

With a focus on the complexities of the Horn of Africa, the authors investigate what exactly is a rising power? The authors explore two questions: what does the growing engagement of rising powers like Turkey entail for peace and security in the Horn of Africa region, and will rising inter-regional relations facilitate/exacerbate tensions? They argue that while rising and middle powers, especially China but also India and Brazil, have made significant contributions to overall trade and development in Africa, recent political engagement and regional expansion/inter-regionalism have contributed to the fragility of the Horn, thereby making the region susceptible to both intra- and inter-state conflicts. At the same time, conflict management processes, state stabilisation (Somalia) and human security have also been undermined as non-traditional security (hereafter NTS) policies that encourage these aspects of security are given less priority.

The authors posit that heightened Turkish (and allied) military activities in the Horn will lead to militarisation of the region, which inevitably reduces the priority previously given to NTS issues such as water, energy and food (the WEF nexus). NTS issues are the primary causes of both state and human insecurity as acute water and food shortages exacerbated by a rapidly growing population increase the likelihood of intra- and/or inter-state armed conflict as people scramble to survive on the limited resources available. The article also shows how this region, like most parts of Africa, faces new and complex NTS issues including terrorism, 'new wars' and climate change. The authors demonstrate how the advent of globalisation, particularly information technologies, has intensified and complicated NTS attempts and measures to promote security on the continent and the region. At the same time, information technologies have advanced the growth of spaces where states have limited, weak, contested or absent authority. Cyber, offshore and shadow banking institutions have been most challenging for states to exert control over because of the rise of powerful non-state actors, notably transnational corporations and networks that contest and sometimes undermine

state authority and legitimacy. The authors argue that while rising and middle powers have contributed to the economy, increased military engagement in the region has unleashed a complex set of inter-regional relations and security challenges that further undermine both state and human security.

In the final analysis, the authors contend that situating and understanding the complexities of such meso- and micro-regionalisms require the juxtaposition of hitherto separate analytic and policy genres: from national and human development/security to old and new insecurities and rising and declining states and economies. Hence the relevance of treating Turkey and the BRICS as rising powers in the Horn: rising powers, regional and otherwise, are coming to disrupt post-Cold War assumptions and arrangements in northeast Africa and elsewhere, necessitating creative (Track Diplomacy 1/2/3) diplomacy and original analytic frameworks.[9]

In guise of conclusion

This collection of articles around the theme of rising powers in international conflict management seeks to analyse the different approaches and practices of a selected group of rising powers in international conflict management: Brazil, India, China and Turkey. This special issue sheds light on the commonalities and divergences in rising powers' understanding and applications of conflict management and attempts to explain the nuances and priorities in their conflict management strategies from conceptual/theoretical and empirical aspects. The case studies in this issue point to the evolving nature of conflict management policies of rising powers as a result of their changing priorities in foreign and security policy and the shifts observed in the international order since the end of the Cold War. The changing conflict management strategies of rising powers cannot be analysed without taking into consideration systematic changes observed in international politics since the 1990s. The decline since the 2000s in the willingness of major powers to play a leading role in the management of international conflicts associated with rising powers' pursuit of active peacebuilding policies as a part of their status politics seems to have changed how nations approach conflict management.

Moreover, it is clear that international conflict management does not follow a single policy or is able to be successfully carried out without the coordination of traditional and rising/middle powers in the global and regional institutional settings. In the current global governance structure, international conflict management now requires a new and much more effective institutional foundation, new concepts and a new distribution of roles among traditional and non-traditional actors. In this regard, UN or non-UN-based initiatives in sustaining peace using existing conflict management tools or the creation of new conflict management tools and mechanisms may help rising powers play much more operational and active roles in peacebuilding. The country specific perspectives provided in this special issue have also proven right the potentialities of rising powers in managing conflicts, as well as their past and ongoing challenges in envisaging crises in both their own regions and extra-regional territories. While Africa appears to be a common denominator in terms of geography in the majority of the rising powers' peacekeeping policies, other regions outside Africa, and their own regions in some cases, remain as geographies in which they pursue reluctant peacekeeping policies. However, not all rising powers actively contribute to UN

peacekeeping operations as seen in the cases of Turkey and Russia. While Turkey prioritises NATO over the UN in its contributions to peacekeeping operations, Russia prefers to act autonomously in the sphere of peacekeeping and contributes to UN peacekeeping activities at a much lower level than other BRICS contributing countries. These differences in rising powers' approaches and practices clearly illustrate the difficulties of defining common objectives in international conflict management. However, the success stories of some rising powers in dealing with international crisis inside or outside the UN make it clear that these states are generally more prone to peace related cooperation either by the use of military or non-military methods/tools. Despite the differences in their strategies and priorities, rising powers all wish to appear as peace brokers in regional and international crises.

Another commonality among rising powers' conflict management policies is their willingness to link their security policies to development and development-related cooperation. Almost all rising powers seek to play active roles in development cooperation as an integral part of their status-seeking policies in global governance. In the last decade, countries such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Mexico have gradually become important donors in the field of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance and have developed efficient policies in this niche diplomacy area at varying degrees. Given this, it must be underlined that any study on international conflict management and peacebuilding must certainly consider the security-development nexus and its increasing centrality in rising powers' conflict management and peacebuilding strategies and preferences. As seen clearly in the cases studies collected in this special issue, rising powers construct their conflict management policies on a mix of realpolitik and idealpolitik. This intermingled approach to conflict management may also help them adopt a holistic approach to development-cantered conflict prevention policies.

In conclusion, it is false to consider all rising powers a homogeneous or a unique bloc giving similar responses to international crises. Their conflict management understanding largely derives from their strategic culture, historical/cultural affinities to certain regions in the world, and national security and foreign policy interests and priorities. However, despite their differences in conflict management approaches and practices, rising powers have the capacity and potential to unite based on jointly defined global interests and under the auspice of international organisations, most specifically the UN. The research undertaken in this special issue and the findings derived from the different case studies justify this argument.

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Notes

1. Oktav et al., *Violent Non-State Actors*.
2. Butler, *International Conflict Management*; Burton and Dukes, *Conflict*; Diehl and Lepgold, *Regional Conflict Management*.
3. Larson, "New Perspectives on Rising Powers"; Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, *Status in World Politics*; Renshon, *Fighting for Status*.
4. Paul, "Global Peaceful Change and Accommodation"; Newman and Zala, "Rising Powers and Order Contestation"; Culp, "How Irresponsible Are Rising Powers?"; Patrick, "Irresponsible Stakeholders?"
5. Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, "Reputation and Status as Motives for War."
6. Lipscy, *Renegotiating the World Order*.
7. Call, *Rising Powers and Peacebuilding*.
8. Destradi, "Reluctance in International Politics."
9. On UAE and Qatar as well as Turkey in Somalia/Somaliland, see *"Gulf Money in Somalia: A Storm Over a Port."*

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