Publication: Müteahhirun dönemi Eş‘Ariyye Kelamında Ma‘Dumun Şeyiyyeti Ve mahiyetlerin yaratılmışlığı problemi
Abstract
yetlerin yaratılmışlığı, Mec‘ûliyet Müteahhirûn Eş‘ariyye Kelâmı ÖZET MÜTEAHHİRÛN DÖNEMİ EŞ’ARİYYE KELÂMINDA MA‘DÛMUN ŞEYİYYETİ VE MÂHİYETLERİN YARATILMIŞLIĞI PROBLEMİ Ma‘dûmun şeyiyyeti problemi, “Bir’den çokluğun (âlemin) nasıl meydana geldiğini” yani yaratma düşüncesini açıklamak üzere ilk defa Basra Mu‘tezile’si eliyle ortaya konulmuş bir düşüncedir. Yaratma fiili ilim, irâde ve kudret sıfatlarının birlikte kombinasyonuyla meydana geldiği düşünüldüğünde, acaba bu sıfatların kendisinde hiçbir yönden ayrışma bulunmayan mahza yokluğa yönelerek (kast) ona ilişmesi (tealluk) mümkün müdür? Söz konusu problem bağlamında Mu‘tezile Allah’ın sıfatları ile onların konuları (müteallak) arasındaki ilişkiyi mümkün kılmak için sıfatların konularının dışta yokluk durumunda birbirinden ayrışarak sâbit olduğunu düşünmüştür. Ayrıca mümkün tikel ma‘dûmların yokluk durumunda birbirlerinden zâtlarıyla ayrıştığını düşünmeleri onlara dışta müşâhede edilen çokluğun salt bir rastlantı ürünü olmadığını söyleme imkânı da sunmaktadır. Diğer taraftan onlara göre mümkün tikel ma‘dûmlar zâtları gereği birbirinden ayrıştığından dolayı fâilin yokluk durumundaki zâtlarda bir tesiri bulunmamaktadır. Fâilin tesiri o zâtları zât kılmada değil, onlara varlık vererek mevcut kılmada gerçekleşmektedir. Dolayısıyla onlara göre yokluk durumunda sâbit zâtlar yaratma konusu değildir. Meşşâî filozofların mâhiyetlerin yaratılmamış olduğu düşüncesi ise Mu‘tezile gibi “Bir’den çokluğun nasıl çıktığı” sorununu izah için ortaya konulmuş bir düşüncedir. Onlar yaratmayı madde-sûret ilişkisi üzerinden açıklamaları ve illetin ma‘lûlüne sadece varlığını verdiğini düşünmeleri sebebiyle illet tarafında kendisine varlık verilmemiş ma‘lûlün diğer ma‘lûllerden ayrışmış bir kendindelik halinin bulunmasını zorunlu görmüşlerdir. Onlar ne varlık ne de yokluk şartıyla olan özel mâhiyetlerin/ hüviyetlerin değil, her türlü varlık lâzımından uzak mutlak mâhiyetlerin yaratılmamış olduğunu düşünmüşlerdir. Bu bakımından onlar Mu‘tezile’nin ma‘dûmun şeyiyyeti düşüncesi ile benzerlik arzederken birçok yönden onlardan ayrılmışlardır. Non-existent (maʻdūm), Thing (Shay), Createdness of the Quiddities, Createdness (Madjʻūliyyah), Muteakhkhirīn Period Asharite Kalām
Whether or not the non-existent (maʻdūm) is a thing (shay), is an idea put forth for the first time by Basrian Muʻtazila to explain ‘how the many can come out of the One’ or in other words the idea of creation. When it is taken into consideration that the act of creation is a combination of the attributes of knowledge (ʻilm), will (irādah) and power (qudrah), it can be questioned whether or not it is possible for these attributes to be directed towards (qasd) and relate with (taalluq) absolute nothingness, which clearly doesn’t contain any distinctness or separation at all. In order to account for the possibility of the attributes of God to relate to their subjects, the Muʻtazila argued that these subjects must be distinctly present (sābit) in the outside world even in their state of non-existence. Furthermore, their conception that the possible but not-existent particulars (el-maʻdūm el-mumkin el-djuzī) are also individualized in their state of non-existence, gives them the opportunity to claim the observed plurality is not a fluke. On the other hand, because the possible but not-existent particular is distinct by necessity of its essence, the creator does not exert any influence whatsoever on their substances in the state of their non-existence. The effect of the creator is not in individualizing said objects, but merely in making them existent by giving them being. In other words all individual objects which are present (sābit) in the state of their non-existence are not subject to the act of creation. The Peripatetic claim that the essences are not created is in the same tenor as the Muʻtazila, an idea put forth to explain the question of ‘how the many can come out of the One’. Because their explanation of creation based on the matter-form duality and the idea that the cause only gives being to its effect, they saw it necessary that the effect which has not yet been bestowed with being, must be distinctly present from other yet non-existent effects. They argued that not the special quiddities which are unconditioned by either existence or non-existence, but the absolute quiddities which are bereft of any existential necessities are uncreated. Although in this regard they share similarities with the Muʻtazilate ‘thingness of the maʻdūm’ theory, they diverge on many other points.
Whether or not the non-existent (maʻdūm) is a thing (shay), is an idea put forth for the first time by Basrian Muʻtazila to explain ‘how the many can come out of the One’ or in other words the idea of creation. When it is taken into consideration that the act of creation is a combination of the attributes of knowledge (ʻilm), will (irādah) and power (qudrah), it can be questioned whether or not it is possible for these attributes to be directed towards (qasd) and relate with (taalluq) absolute nothingness, which clearly doesn’t contain any distinctness or separation at all. In order to account for the possibility of the attributes of God to relate to their subjects, the Muʻtazila argued that these subjects must be distinctly present (sābit) in the outside world even in their state of non-existence. Furthermore, their conception that the possible but not-existent particulars (el-maʻdūm el-mumkin el-djuzī) are also individualized in their state of non-existence, gives them the opportunity to claim the observed plurality is not a fluke. On the other hand, because the possible but not-existent particular is distinct by necessity of its essence, the creator does not exert any influence whatsoever on their substances in the state of their non-existence. The effect of the creator is not in individualizing said objects, but merely in making them existent by giving them being. In other words all individual objects which are present (sābit) in the state of their non-existence are not subject to the act of creation. The Peripatetic claim that the essences are not created is in the same tenor as the Muʻtazila, an idea put forth to explain the question of ‘how the many can come out of the One’. Because their explanation of creation based on the matter-form duality and the idea that the cause only gives being to its effect, they saw it necessary that the effect which has not yet been bestowed with being, must be distinctly present from other yet non-existent effects. They argued that not the special quiddities which are unconditioned by either existence or non-existence, but the absolute quiddities which are bereft of any existential necessities are uncreated. Although in this regard they share similarities with the Muʻtazilate ‘thingness of the maʻdūm’ theory, they diverge on many other points.