Publication: Fıkıh kelam ilişkisi bağlamında ibaha kavramının analizi
Abstract
Bu çalışmamızda özellikle fıkıh usulü ilminde yer alan ibâha kavramını usul-ı fıkıh ve kelam ilişkisi bağlamında ele aldık. İbâha kavramı, fıkıhta kişinin bir eylemi işleyip işlememe hususunda mutlak anlamda serbestliğini ifade eder. Henüz erken dönemde ortaya çıkan dini hükümlerin şer‘îliği-aklîliği tartışmasının zeminini oluşturan ibâha hükmü, özellikle şer‘î bildirim öncesi insanların eylemlerinden sorumlu olup olmayacağı çerçevesinde tartışılmış ve bu mesele çerçevesinde mezheplerin hüküm teorisi şekillenmiştir. Husün-kubuh meselesinin en somut semeresi olan bu tartışmada mezheplerin aklın fonksiyonu ile ilgili görüşleri açıklığa kavuşmaktadır. Aklın dini hukukun oluşumundaki fonksiyonu ve sınırı ile ilgili en fazla veriyi şer‘î bildirimin olmadığı toplumlarda eylemlerin hükmü ile ilgili tartışmada bulmaktayız. Can güvenliği, hürriyet ve mülkiyet gibi en temel hakların uhrevî sorumluluk getiren hukukî niteliğe sahip olabilmesi için şer‘î bildirimin varlığını şart koşan Eş‘arîler ile aklın doğası gereği bir takım hükümleri idrak edebileceğini savunan Mu‘tezile arasında cereyan eden bu tartışma, Mu‘tezilenin dini ispat/ temellendirme gayesiyle ortaya attığı iddia ile gündeme gelmiştir. İbâha hükmü bu ciddi iddianın bir örneklemi konumundadır. Aslî (aklî) ibâha-şer‘î ibâha tartışmasının lafzî bir tartışma olduğunu iddia edenlerin aksine ihtilafın arka planında yatan kelamî ilkeleri izah ederek konuyu analiz ettik. Eşyanın aslının mubah mı yoksa mahzur mu olduğu tartışması mülkiyet teorisi ile ele alınmaktadır. Bu durum füru‘ eserlere de yansımış olduğundan ibâhayı furu’ fıkıhta mukabili “milki” açıklayarak ele aldık.
In this study, we have discussed the concept of ibāha, which is generally treated in the principles of jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh), in the context of the relationship between the principles of jurisprudence and kalam. The concept of ibāha expresses the absolute freedom of the person in Islamic jursiprudence whether to commit an action. The norm of ibāha, which forms the basis of the debate of the shar'ism-rationality of the religious norms that emerged in the early period, had been discussed especially within the framework of whether people would be responsible for their actions before the declaration of religion, and the various sects had shaped their theories of norms within the framework of this debate. In these discussions, which is the most concrete result of the husn-kubh issue, the views of the sects on the function of reason have become clear. We find the most data on the function and limit of reason during the formation of religious law in the discussions about the legal condition of actions in societies where there is no religious declaration. This debate, which took place between the Ash'arites, who stipulated the existence of the Shari'ah in order for the most basic rights such as life, freedom and property to have a legal quality with otherworldly responsibility, and the Mu'tazila, who argued that the mind can comprehend certain norms due to its nature, had come to the fore with the efforts of the Mu’tazila to prove and establish the rationality of religion. The concept of ibāha is an example of these serious efforts. Contrary to those who claim that the original (rational) ibāha-shar'i ibāha debate is a literal one, we have analyzed the issue by explaining the theological principles underlying this conflict. The discussion of whether the original of condition of things is permissible or forbidden is discussed together with the theory of property. Since these debates are also reflected in the works of furu‘ al-fiqh, we have discussed ibāha by explaining its counterpart milk as it takes place in these furu‘ works as such.
In this study, we have discussed the concept of ibāha, which is generally treated in the principles of jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh), in the context of the relationship between the principles of jurisprudence and kalam. The concept of ibāha expresses the absolute freedom of the person in Islamic jursiprudence whether to commit an action. The norm of ibāha, which forms the basis of the debate of the shar'ism-rationality of the religious norms that emerged in the early period, had been discussed especially within the framework of whether people would be responsible for their actions before the declaration of religion, and the various sects had shaped their theories of norms within the framework of this debate. In these discussions, which is the most concrete result of the husn-kubh issue, the views of the sects on the function of reason have become clear. We find the most data on the function and limit of reason during the formation of religious law in the discussions about the legal condition of actions in societies where there is no religious declaration. This debate, which took place between the Ash'arites, who stipulated the existence of the Shari'ah in order for the most basic rights such as life, freedom and property to have a legal quality with otherworldly responsibility, and the Mu'tazila, who argued that the mind can comprehend certain norms due to its nature, had come to the fore with the efforts of the Mu’tazila to prove and establish the rationality of religion. The concept of ibāha is an example of these serious efforts. Contrary to those who claim that the original (rational) ibāha-shar'i ibāha debate is a literal one, we have analyzed the issue by explaining the theological principles underlying this conflict. The discussion of whether the original of condition of things is permissible or forbidden is discussed together with the theory of property. Since these debates are also reflected in the works of furu‘ al-fiqh, we have discussed ibāha by explaining its counterpart milk as it takes place in these furu‘ works as such.